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Abstract 
 
   Following the Revolutionary War, the British ceded the Northwest 
Territory to the United States.  This territory was the land north and west of the Ohio River to the 
Mississippi.  The territory corresponds to the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, 
Wisconsin and an eastern portion of Minnesota.  With Britain controlling the Great Lakes to the 
north and Spain to the south and west, this remained a landlocked territory whose only access to 
the eastern seaboard was over rugged mountain trails.  In 1784, George Washington wrote of the 
need to link the western territory to the eastern states.  He proposed an improved road to link an 
eastern river with the Ohio.  Washington’s vision was accomplished as Congress enacted 
legislation during the Jefferson Administration for this infrastructure project.  In 1811, work 
began at Fort Cumberland on the Potomac River in Maryland.  The road conquered the 
mountains and reached the Ohio River in 1818.  Originally known as the Cumberland Road, the 
National Road was eventually extended to Columbus, Ohio, Indianapolis, Indiana and finally 
Vandalia, Illinois in 1837.   The federal funding and oversight of the road faced challenges from 
narrow readings of constitutional authority.  Proponents of the road resorted to alarmist rhetoric, 
portraying the road as necessary, even vital, to prevent the nation becoming divided and 
separated by the mountainous terrain.  This paper will evaluate the alarmist rhetoric in relation to 
the potential threats of disunion.  Primary and secondary sources will be used in an 
ethnographical analysis of western culture and nationalism to demonstrate that the western 
settlers were patriots.  The threat of disunion was used to justify federal control and funding for 
the National Road.  
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Introduction 
 
 The history of the National Road and Trans-Appalachian America really began on July 4, 
1778.  George Rogers Clark, as a militia officer for the Commonwealth of Virginia, led his 
American force to victory over the British post at Kaskaskia on the Mississippi River in the 
Illinois Territory.  Clark’s further victories in the Trans-Appalachian western territories 
contributed to the United States’ possession of the Northwest Territories by the Treaty of Paris in 
1783.  The territories incorporated the lands north of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi.  
This area generally corresponds to the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and 
the eastern portion of Minnesota today.  This had been a disputed territory between Native 
Americans, France, and Britain.  It had recently been attached to Quebec by British in the 
Quebec Act in 1774.  This action by the British was in response to the Boston Tea Party and 
growing tension with the American Colonies.  This attachment to Quebec added to the conflict 
between Britain and the colonies, as R. Carlyle Buley states “Virginia, who claimed the land by 
charter grant, as well as other colonies who felt they were being cut off from westward 
expansion, regarded the act as one of the ‘Intolerable Acts.’’1  After the Treaty of Paris ceded the 
land of the Northwest Territory to the United States, Virginia and the other states with claims to 
the lands west of the Ohio River transferred these western territories to the United States 
government in the 1784 Cession Act.   
There had been few British settlers in the territory.  D.E. Lindstom notes the constrictions 
on settlement as “King George III prohibited his subjects from making purchases or settlements 
                                                           
1 R. Carlyle Buley, The Old Northwest Pioneer Period, 1815 – 1840 Vol. I (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1950), 17. 
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in this region because the English Board of Trade wished to confine all new settlements on the 
Atlantic Coast within easy reach of the trade and commerce of Great Britain.”2  As settlers began 
to move to the north bank of the Ohio River and filter west through the mountains, the United 
States government passed legislation such as the Land Ordinance of 1784 and the Northwest 
Ordinance in 1787 to administer this new American territory.  The latter ordinance has been 
described as such “The Northwest Ordinance ensured a uniform governmental system and 
guaranteed eventual statehood, although the territorial governments were more authoritarian than 
most settlers wanted.”3  These ordinances had few stipulations, but important among them was 
that they were to be free from slavery.   
The emigrants to the new territory found it was sparsely populated, with little 
governmental structure or presence.  Historians have referred to the territory as in a state of 
almost anarchy.  The early emigrants settled in river valleys near waterways, leaving regions 
farther from navigable water largely uninhabited.  An early settler, John Reynolds, described the 
area of Illinois at the turn of the 19th century.  He states “During this period, Illinois was isolated 
from the States, and it was a remote, weak, and desolate colony.”4  The western territories were a 
vast borderland area.  There was conflict between the United States, Native American, and 
European nations and cultures.  It was a place of danger as the new American emigrants invaded 
the lands that others considered their own.   
                                                           
2 D.E. Lindstrom, “The Influence of Race and Culture on the Development of Social Organization in Illinois,” 
Social Forces, 13, no. 4, (May, 1935): 569. 
3 Robert P. Swierenga, “The Settlement of the Old Northwest: Ethnic Pluralism in a Featureless Plain,” Journal of 
the Early Republic, 9, no. 1, (Spring, 1989): 74. 
4 John Reynolds, My Own Times: Embracing Also, the History of My Life (Chicago: Chicago Historical Society, 
1879), 44. 
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The settlement of this vast territory faced many challenges, one of the chief being that of 
access.  The area was basically landlocked.  The Appalachian Mountains separated the 
Northwest Territories from the established U.S. states on the eastern side of the mountains.  To 
the west of the Mississippi River were the unexplored lands of the Louisiana Territory held by 
Spain.  To the north, the British controlled the Great Lakes, and access to the St. Lawrence 
Seaway.  To the south, the Spanish controlled the lower Mississippi River.  The port of New 
Orleans was essentially closed to American shipping by Spain with an excessive tariff.  Even 
when these waterways were later opened for shipping, transportation was risky.  Water transport 
had to contend with varying water levels, sand bars, snags, ice, pirates and Native American 
attacks.  Robert Ankli noted “Many of the flatboats destined for New Orleans – perhaps as many 
as one fifth to one fourth – were snagged and never reached the city.”5  The return upstream was 
also challenging.  A shipment by flatboat to New Orleans, and the return trip overland, took 
approximately six months.   
Before the age of steam-powered shipping, water transport on the Mississippi River was 
essentially one way, and that was downstream.  It was difficult to bring manufactured goods 
north up the Mississippi.  Thaddeus Harris explains this stating, “ The vessels, therefore, from 
any of the Atlantic ports in the United States which come to trade at New Orleans, and to receive 
the produce of the Western Territory there deposited, must come empty; except on those few 
articles which may be wanted in the island and its immediate vicinity; for, as it is very difficult 
and expensive to ascend the river, even with small boats, and as the demand for foreign articles 
is not equal to one twentieth part of the quantity of exports, the people of the upper country will 
                                                           
5 Robert Ankli, “Agricultural Growth in Antebellum Illinois,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, 63, no. 
4, (Winter, 1970): 388. 
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always produce their goods either at Washington, Baltimore, or Philadelphia, and have them 
brought thence in wagons.”6  Western produce could be shipped downstream, but eastern or 
foreign manufactured goods for the settlers of the Trans-Appalachian territories had to be packed 
in over the mountain trails. 
In 1784, George Washington, accompanied by surveyor Albert Gallatin, explored the 
Trans-Allegheny region.  Washington and Gallatin formed a similar opinion on the need for a 
means of overland transport through the mountains.  The only way to access the new American 
territory was by mountain trails, limiting goods to what could be carried by a packhorse, about 
two hundred pounds, per horse.  The trails would be doubly difficult when they were choked 
with snow in the winter or when they turned to mud in the spring.  In October, 1784, Washington 
wrote to Benjamin Harrison of this need to connect the Northwest Territories to the eastern 
states.  His plan was to link a navigable eastern tributary of the Ohio River to a navigable 
western tributary of the Potomac or James River.7  In 1803, an act of Congress established this 
road at Fort Cumberland Maryland at the western navigable waters of the Potomac River.  
Thusly named the Cumberland Road, it was later known as the National Road. 
This road project had broad political and economic support.  This was not limited to 
politicians and merchants.  Seymour Dunbar notes “By the year 1800 a country-wide demand for 
good turnpikes was manifest.  So many proposals for work of the character were introduced in 
every legislature that it became evident the states themselves could not undertake general 
                                                           
6 Thaddeus Mason Harris, The Journal of a Tour into the Territory Northwest of the Alleghany Mountains (Boston: 
Manning & Loring, 1805), 145. 
7 George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, October 1784. George Washington Writings, John Rhodehamel, ed. 
(New York: Library of America, 1997), 560. 
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highway construction.”8  There were two main options for a road through the mountains.  The 
old Braddock Road had been cut through the forests and mountains of Pennsylvania in 1775 
during the Seven Years War.  The Braddock Road had not been maintained for wagon traffic, but 
it was still in use as a mountain trail.  The other option was Daniel Boone’s Wilderness Road 
through the Cumberland Gap to Kentucky. 
A road through the mountains was an expensive multi-state undertaking.  It faced 
challenges mainly of oversight and funding.  If left to the individual states, it was unlikely to 
receive the oversight and funding desperately needed.  The only reasonable option was it being a 
federal project.  Albert Gallatin, the young surveyor who had accompanied Washington in 1784 
(later Jefferson’s Secretary of Treasury) came up with a solution.  In 1802, Ohio petitioned for 
statehood.  As a part of this petition, Gallatin proposed that a portion of government land sales be 
applied to the funding of the road through the mountains to the Ohio River.  As there was far 
more government land available for sale in the Northwest Territories than in the more settled 
state of Kentucky, the northern route along the old Braddock Road was selected for the project.   
Federalist politicians such as Hamilton supported a strong central government and internal 
improvement projects such and road and bridge infrastructure.  However, this concept of federal 
oversight and funding faced challenges from states’ rights factions, such as the Democratic 
Republicans.  They feared that expanding federal power to oversee multi-state operations would 
lead to a federal government continuing to grow in power and authority over the states.  In 1800, 
the Democratic-Republican candidate Thomas Jefferson was elected president.  Jefferson found 
himself in a conflicted position.  He and his supporters maintained the position of states’ rights, 
                                                           
8 Seymour Dunbar, A History of Travel in America (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1937), 320. 
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but he also supported the idea of the National Road.  Jefferson, in his terms of office, was able to 
pass the legislation for the construction of the National Road.  He did this by portraying the road 
as necessary for national security.  Jefferson was concerned that the western territories, if not 
“cemented” to the eastern states, might join with another nation such as Britain or Spain.  There 
was also the possibility that the western settlers could even declare independence from the 
United States.  Jefferson urged the construction of a road as a necessary unifying agent of the 
nation spatially separated by a mountain range.  He was joined in this by other young 
Democratic-Republican leaders such as John Calhoun and Henry Clay.   
Jefferson and other proponents of the road used alarmist rhetoric to emphasize the threat 
to national unity.  This threat in a large part proved persuasive enough to overcome opposition 
voices and promoted the federal funding and control of the project.  Jefferson and other eastern 
politicians did have cause for legitimate concern.  While they may have used alarmist rhetoric, it 
was an honest attempt to portray the situation as they saw it.  However, by the time of the road 
legislation, they were mistaken in this assessment.  The Act to Regulate the Laying Out and 
Making a Road from Cumberland, in the State of Maryland, to the State of Ohio was not signed 
into law until 1806.  By this time, threats to national security had been sufficiently mitigated to 
be negligible.  The western settlers did have a strong sense of nationalism.  They had animosity 
towards the British and Spanish governments, which would have prevented the western settlers 
from joining with these other nations.  As to their own independence, primary sources indicate 
the western settlers were patriots, and they maintained a strong sense of individual liberty as well 
as loyalty to the United States. 
The National Road proved to be a considerable factor in overcoming the landlock 
challenge for the Northwest Territory.  It dramatically improving access and communication 
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over the mountains.  By 1818, the road had conquered the mountains of Pennsylvania and 
reached the Ohio River.  By 1837, a letter carried by the post on the National Road would go 
from Washington, DC to Columbus, Ohio in just forty-five hours.  The pack horse, limited to a 
two-hundred-pound load had been replaced with the Conestoga wagon.  This heavy wagon 
carried a standard load of six thousand pounds, and it could carry up to ten thousand.  The trickle 
of settlers turned into a surge of emigration to the western lands.  This flood of settlers resulted 
in a dramatic change in demographics that transformed the nation.  The population center of the 
United States began to move west.  By the time of the Civil War, this formerly sparsely 
populated territory contributed almost a million soldiers to the Union Army.  Close to half of the 
Union forces came from the states of the former Northwest Territory. 
The topic of the oversight and funding of the construction of the National Road is 
actually quite a complex issue.  It addresses constitutional questions and debates.  There are 
domestic and international political issues.  It involves the need of a road for commerce, 
emigration, military logistics and the national mail service.  The Democratic Republicans 
wrestled with states’ rights versus the need of federal oversight for multi-state internal 
improvements.  There were questions if the government could fund and oversee the road under 
constitutional authority such as to establish post roads, as logistic support for the army, or to 
regulate commerce.  Presidents Jefferson, Madison and Monroe recommended passing an 
amendment to the Constitution, expanding the authority of the federal government as the best 
way to overcome this conflict and fund the project.  Faced with a Congress unwilling to amend 
the Constitution, the alarmist rhetoric was used to justify what many states’ rights advocates saw 
as federal overreach.   
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The historiography of the National Road presents the proponents such as Washington and 
Jefferson as being genuinely concerned of a threat to national unity.  Many sources cite the 
above-mentioned Washington letter to Harrison, as Washington also stated in this letter, “I need 
not remark to you Sir, that the flanks & rear of the United States are possessed by other powers - 
& formidable ones, too; nor how necessary it is to apply the cement of interest, to bind all part of 
the Union together by indissoluble bonds – especially that part of it, which lies immediately west 
of us, with the middle States.”9 He goes on to say, “The Western settlers, (I speak now from my 
own observation) stand as it were upon a pivot – the touch of a feather, would turn them any 
way…because they have no other means of coming to us but by a long Land transportation and 
unimproved roads.”10  The historiography also often cites Jefferson, usually noting a passage in 
his Sixth Annual Message where he echoed Washington’s letter as he promoted transportation 
improvements, stating, “By these operations new channels of communication will be opened 
between the States; the lines of separation will disappear, their interests will be identified, and 
their union cemented by new and indissoluble ties.”11  Washington and Jefferson both used the 
phrase that the road was needed to “cement” the nation into a whole.  These two passages find 
their way into much of the historiography, portraying the belief that the road was a necessary 
agent in national unity. 
  Perhaps the strongest language was used by Henry Clay.  He referred to the question of 
funding the extension of the road in 1824 in a speech as related by the Niles Register, “Yet he 
would say thus much: that he considered the question, as to the existence and the exercise of a 
                                                           
9  Letter to Benjamin Harrison October 10, 1784, George Washington Writings, John Rhodehamel ed. (New York: 
The Library of America, 1997), 562. 
10 Washington Letter to Harrison, 563. 
11 Thomas Jefferson, “Sixth Annual Message” Jefferson: Autobiography, Notes on the State of Virginia, Public and 
Private Papers, Addresses, Letters (New York: The Library of America, 1984), 529. 
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power in the government to carry into effect a system of internal improvements, as amounting to 
the question whether the union of these states should be preserved or not…(italics mine).”12  The 
article continues as Clay speaks of common origin, language and law writing, “But, asked Mr. 
C., have we not seen, in at least one instance in history, that all these have not been strong 
enough to prevent a total and lasting separation….Among the causes which go to increase the 
tendencies to separation, in such a system as ours, may be enumerated the lofty mountains which 
separates different parts of our country – the extended space over which our population and 
government are spread, together with the different scenes to which commercial pursuits lead the 
citizens of different districts of the union.”13  Here is Henry Clay using strong words that the 
question of funding the National Road was in essence a question of preserving the union of the 
states.    
The historiography on the National Road is limited.  There are surprisingly few scholarly 
books written on the National Road.  Most of the books are from the early or middle of the 20th 
century.  Theodore Sky’s 2011 contribution The National Road and the Difficult Path to 
Sustainable National Investment is the only book published in the last twenty years.14  The books 
that have been published generally echo these statements by the proponents of the road, 
Washington, Jefferson and Clay.  The historiography agrees that these political leaders feared 
that the mountainous terrain had the potential to cause the Northwest Territory to break away 
from the rest of the United States.  In addition to the above quotes, writers often cite the Whiskey 
Rebellion in western Pennsylvania in the 1790’s or the Aaron Burr Conspiracy in the Ohio 
                                                           
12 “Mr. Clay’s Speech,” Niles’ Register (Baltimore, MD), Feb. 5, 1825. 357. 
13 “Mr. Clay’s Speech,” 359. 
14 Theodore Sky, The National Road and the Difficult Path to Sustainable National Investment (Newark: University 
of Delaware Press, 2011), all pages. 
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Valley in 1805 as incidents that were held to be indicators of a territory in danger of intrigue and 
revolt.   
My objective is to add to the existing historiography by presenting the perspective of the 
western settlers.  In particular, this paper will examine the question as to whether there were 
actual threats to national unity, and it will examine the question of these threats from the Trans-
Appalachian, western perspective.  The western settlers were also avid proponents of the 
National Road.  They too wanted better ties with the east that a road over the mountains would 
provide.  Rather than seeing danger from the western intrigues and rebellions, there is a case to 
be made that these intrigues failed largely because of the strong loyalty of the western citizens.  
Before the opening of the National Road, the western settlers were largely a mix of the earlier 
French and British settlers, joined with the Federalist New Englanders and Upper South 
Democratic Republicans.  They had conflicts among themselves, and grievances against the 
federal government, but they were still loyal citizens.  The rhetoric used by Jefferson and others 
was effective in attaining the objective of federal oversight, but it did not paint an accurate 
picture of the political climate in the Trans-Appalachian region. 
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Chapter 1: Historiography 
 
The National Road terminated at Vandalia, Illinois in 1837, but the first history of the 
road was not written until much later.  Thomas Searight grew up alongside the road in Fayette 
County in the southwestern corner of Pennsylvania.  In 1894 he self-published his book The Old 
Pike: A History of the National Road, With Incidents, Accidents, and Anecdotes Thereon, to fill 
this void in the historiography.  The first one hundred or so pages of his book consist of 
Congressional records including reports, bills and speeches.  Searight’s compilation of 
documents provides the reader with the essential government records on the construction of the 
National Road.   His work includes copies of legislation such as the 1806 Act to Regulate the 
Laying Out and Making a Road from Cumberland, in the State of Maryland, to the State of Ohio.  
This and other documents are included in their entirety.  Some of these records are rather routine 
and mundane, such as accounts of funds received and spent.  However, the inclusion of this 
quantitative data illustrates the comprehensiveness of his efforts to collect the Congressional 
documents on the National Road.   
The rest of Searight’s book is a collection of stories about the people and travel along the 
National Road.  These include descriptions of the taverns and inns, the wagon drivers, the 
travelers and the emigrants.  He includes photographs of surviving taverns, bridges and people, 
such as wagon drivers who worked on the road.  This book is not a historical analysis, rather it is 
a collection.  As such, it is a valuable resource for future readers and historians of the National 
Road.   
Searight does not address the questions of western nationalism or the conflict over federal 
funding or oversight.  His work, as the first foundation book of the historiography, merely states 
12 
 
 
 
in his introduction, “It was a highway at once so grand and imposing, an artery so largely 
instrumental in promoting the early growth and development of our country’s wonderful 
resources, so influential in strengthening the bonds of the American Union, and at the same time 
so replete with important events and interesting incidents, that the writer of these pages has long 
cherished a hope that some capable hand would write its history and collect and preserve its 
legends, and no one having come forward to perform the task, he has ventured upon it himself, 
with unaffected diffidence and a full knowledge of his inability to do justice to the subject.”1  
This mention of “strengthening the bonds” is his only allusion to the National Road’s role in  
“cementing” the national regions together. 
While Searight’s book is not an actual historical analysis, he does present his 
observations as a faithful account of the history of the road.  His descriptions allude to cultural 
attitudes such as racism.  He writes of seeing slaves, stating, “The writer has seen them driven 
over the road, arranged in couples and fastened to a long, thick rope or cable like horses.  This 
may seem incredible to a majority of persons now living along the road, but it is true, and was a 
very common sight in the early history of the road and evoked no expression of surprise, or 
words of censure.”2  Searight’s comments show a willingness on his part to present the 
comprehensive history, including what his contemporaries would find offensive.  He does not 
omit certain topics to glorify the history of his own homeland.  His work, as the first history of 
the road, told the bad as well as the good.  As a historian, it’s likely he was familiar with a 
history of treason and threat of disunion in Trans-Appalachian Pennsylvania, but he does not 
                                                           
1 Thomas B. Searight, The Old Pike: A History of the National Road, With Incidents, Accidents, and Anecdotes 
Thereon (Uniontown PA, Searight, 1894), 13. 
2 Searight, The Old Pike, 109. 
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mention this in his book.  In his stories of the people and the life along the road, Searight 
attempts to provide an accurate portrayal of the cultural view of the people of the western states 
and territories.  Conspiracy and disunion are not a part of his portrayal of the western 
communities.   
At the turn of the 20th century, three historians fulfilled Searight’s wish that others would 
write the history of the National Road.  In 1901, History Professor Archer Butler Hulbert added 
his contribution.  His article “The Old National Road: The Historic Highway of America,” was 
published in The Ohio Archaeological and Historic Publications.3  This article was just one of 
several of his Historic Highways of America series.  As such, they were targeted for the general 
reader of American History.  Hulbert’s objective was to demonstrate how the Cumberland Road 
was one of the most important aspects of western expansion.  Though written for the popular 
audience, it is a scholarly work.  It includes citations from government documents, maps, and 
quantitative data.   Hulbert briefly discusses several aspects of the road that were not in 
Searight’s earlier work.  He has chapters on the political conflicts and the actual building of the 
road.  He describes how it transformed the western territories increasing communication, such as 
through improved mail service.  He also describes how freight and passenger transport were 
improved by the road.   
While Searight only briefly touched on the national unifying impact of the road, Hulbert 
makes a much stronger emphasis on this topic.  He describes the road as, “…a thoroughfare 
which should, in one generation, bind distant and half-acquainted states together in bonds of 
                                                           
3 Archer Butler Hulbert, “The Old National Road: The Historic Highway of America,” The Ohio Archaeological 
and Historic Publications vol IX, (1901): 404-519. 
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common interest, sympathy and ambition.”4  In referring to the new territory, he says, “So 
patriotic and so thoroughly American is the central west today, that is also difficult to realize by 
what a slender thread it hung to the fragile republic east of the mountains during the two decades 
succeeding the Revolutionary War.  The whole world looked upon the east and west as realms 
distinct as Italy and France, and for the same geographical reasons.”5  As to the nationalism of 
the western settlers, Hulbert states “Through all those years, when Burr and others ‘played fast 
and loose with conspiracy’, the loyalty of the west was far less sure than one can easily 
believe.”6  Hulbert uses these statements to emphasize the agency of the National Road in 
unifying the country.  These statements echo the fears of the earlier proponents of the road such 
as Washington, Jefferson and Clay.  Hulbert’s work is perhaps the first scholarly analysis of the 
National Road.  His emphasis of the fragile national ties between east and west will be echoed by 
the historiography for the remainder of the 20th century. 
Another early work is the doctoral dissertation The Cumberland National Road by 
History Professor Edwin Erle Sparks.7  As a past president of Penn State University, the 
university library has a collection of Sparks’ papers.  A draft of this unpublished dissertation is 
found in these Penn State Archives.  The draft is undated, but it would fall somewhere between 
1888 and 1902.  As to the earlier date, Sparks cites Burke Aaron Hinsdale’s 1888 book The Old 
Northwest.8  A slightly later date for Sparks’ work is likely as he enrolled in the doctoral 
program at the University of Chicago in 1895.  An additional point is that Thomas Searight had 
                                                           
4 Hulbert, Old National Road, 406. 
5 Hulbert, Old National Road, 406.   
6 Hulbert, Old National Road, 407. 
7 Edwin Erle Sparks, The Cumberland National Road (Penn State University Libraries, Edwin Erle Sparks paper 
1870 – 1940, Writings), all pages. 
8 Burke Aaron Hinsdale, The Old Northwest: With a View of the Thirteen Colonies as Constituted by the Royal 
Charters (New York: Townsend, Mac Coun, 1888), all pages.  
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collected a considerable amount of information for his 1894 book, and Searight was not familiar 
with Sparks’ work.  It is more likely that Searight’s book influenced Sparks to write a historical 
analysis of the subject.  Also, as to the later date of the manuscript, it was mentioned in the 
preface of another history of the National Road dated 1902.   
Hulbert’s work was published in 1901, so the Sparks manuscript may vie with Hulbert as 
the first scholarly analysis of the National Road.  Unlike Hulbert’s work, Sparks manuscript was 
not written as a popular work.  It was his dissertation for his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago.  
Sparks work is a comprehensive history of the road, from the early migrations and transportation 
history in the nation.  He discusses the political process, the construction, maintenance and 
oversight of the National Road until it was surpassed by the railroads and turned over to the 
administration of the states.  Sparks speaks of the unifying aspect of the road throughout his 
paper.  He refers to the mountains and how they threatened disunion stating, “The treatment of 
the western states in earlier days when the question of the free navigation of the Mississippi 
threatened to dismember the infant republic was freely aired in these sectional discussions and 
the natural tendency toward secession which intervening mountains engender was often dwelt 
upon.”9  Sparks does not address threats due to domestic or international intrigues, rather he 
notes the geographical obstacles and how the road mitigated this threat and became a unifying 
agent for the nation. 
 In 1902, Jeremiah Young presented his contribution with his Doctoral dissertation, A 
Political and Constitutional Study of the Cumberland Road.10   Young’s work as a dissertation 
                                                           
9 Sparks, Cumberland National Road, 38. 
10 Jeremiah Simeon Young, A Political and Constitutional Study of the Cumberland Road: A Dissertation (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1902), all pages. 
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was also a scholarly analysis of the topic.  This was the 1902 work that made the passing 
reference to the Sparks manuscript.  Young also mentions the works by Searight and Hulbert.  
Young’s objective was to present the history of the origin and administration of the Cumberland 
Road with special attention to the political and constitutional aspects.  Young, like many later 
writers, discussed the backstory of Washington’s interest in the road.  Young also describes the 
role of Gallatin and his influence as Secretary of the Treasury to promote the legislation for the 
road.  Much of the historiography discusses how the road was financed through the sale of 
western lands.  As a political analysis, Young’s book also introduces this new political aspect. 
He describes the maneuverings for funding, stating, “Appropriations for the Cumberland Road 
were usually made under the fiction of ‘advances’ from the federal treasury, reimbursable from 
the ‘2 percent fund,’ and were special in most cases.”11.  This interesting aspect illustrates that 
the majority in Congress, while debating the propriety of federal control, were quite committed 
to the idea of the National Road.   
  On the point of national unity, Young discusses the Whiskey Rebellion and Aaron Burr, 
adding the 1784 State of Franklin movement in Tennessee.  In addition to these threats, he also 
notes the geography of the mountain range as a threat of disunion.  These three works by 
Hulbert, Sparks and Young, completed at the turn of the century, establish the historiography of 
the National Road as a project that was necessary to mitigate a threat of disunion of a nation.  
These threats came from domestic as well as international forces, and they were largely due to 
the geographical separation at the Appalachians Mountains.  Hulbert and Young in particular 
introduce the proponents Washington, Gallatin, Jefferson and Clay into the role of champions, or 
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fathers, of the road.  The statements and positions of these four political leaders on the threat to 
disunity are established in the historiography by these two works. 
 Additional books on the National Road echo this threat of disunity, often using the same 
geographical observations, domestic and international intrigues, and the same quotes of the 
proponents.  Philip D. Jordan wrote The National Road in 1948 as part of The American Trails 
Series for the general reader of American History.12  While this is not necessarily an academic 
work, it’s actually well cited and has a good bibliography.   Much of the book is devoted to 
stories of life along the road.  He describes the “shake guts” wagons that transported passengers, 
the freight haulers, the drovers, as well as the establishments along the road.  As to the question 
of whether the road was needed because of threats of disunion, Jordan agrees with the earlier 
historiography.  He states, “Good roads were necessary if Ohio was to cement itself into the 
expanding Union.  A nation of sections with no adequate means of communication among them 
was apt to develop prejudices that might well lead to disunion.”13  Jordon does not mention the 
intrigues, but he agrees that the mountains could lead to disunion. 
 In 1990, Merritt Ierley wrote Traveling the National Road: Across the Centuries on 
America’s First Highway.14  Ierley’s book is largely a collection of first-hand accounts from the 
personal journals of people who recorded their travel over the National Road, although Ierley 
does include some background history in this book as well.  He agrees with the general 
historiography as to the road being necessary for national unity.   He describes the conflict of the 
Whiskey Rebellion and states, “A few years later, a still broadening conception of federal 
                                                           
12 Phillip D. Jordan, The National Road (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948), all pages. 
13 Jordan, The National Road, 71. 
14 Merritt Ierley, Traveling the National Road: Across the Centuries on America’s First Highway (Woodstock, NY, 
Overlook Press, 1990), all pages. 
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authority would be expressed in the building of a national road simply because it served a 
national purpose – a road that would help keep in check this potentially troublesome frontier as 
well as provide for more efficient transportation of good to market.”15  In his assessment, he too 
describes how the nation was divided by the mountainous terrain.  He notes how in Europe, such 
a long mountain range as the Appalachians would serve as a natural boundary, dividing the 
continent into separate nations. 
 One of the most significant additions to the historiography was The National Road, edited 
by Karl Raitz in 1996.16  This was published as the first of a two-part set with its sister volume A 
Guide to The National Road, the latter being a description of the route and sights of the road.17  
In this first volume, Raitz and fellow contributors present a historical appraisal of the National 
Road, including its cultural impact.  The book covers a wide variety of topics including sectional 
conflicts, regional routes of emigration, and the political challenges to building the road.  As to 
the question of the road being needed for national unity, this book also agrees with the existing 
historiography.  It presents the Whiskey Rebellion and the Burr Conspiracy as potential threats to 
national unity.  In his contribution, Joseph Wood states, “With such goings-on, it was no political 
impossibility, many in the period of the early republic believed, for the Mississippi Valley to 
separate eventually from the eastern seaboard.”18  This welcome and scholarly addition to the 
historiography at the end of the century is in agreement with those of the previous one hundred 
years. 
                                                           
15 Ierley, Traveling the National Road, 24. 
16 Karl Raitz, The National Road (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), all pages. 
17 Karl Raitz, A Guide to the National Road (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), all pages. 
18 Joseph S. Wood, “The Idea of a National Road,” The National Road, Raitz, ed., 109. 
19 
 
 
 
 Shorter books, pamphlets and articles throughout the century echoed similar sentiments.  
Lee Burns, writing in 1919 of the National Road in Indiana, mentions George Washington 
stating, “He was convinced that unless some better means were found for communication with 
the east, the western settlers might find it to their interests to form an alliance with the Spaniards 
at New Orleans, which was readily accessible to them by water.”19  Norris F. Schneider wrote 
The National Road: Main Street of America. for the Ohio Historical Society in 1975.20 This short 
book is a brief but well-presented history of the National Road.  Schneider describes the roles of 
the three key early backers of the road being Washington, Jefferson and Gallatin.  He cites 
Washington’s letter to Harrison that expressed his view of the Trans-Alleghany being on a pivot, 
in danger of turning to Britain or Spain.  He also cites Jefferson’s statement that the road is 
needed to “cement” the nation together.  The resulting road he notes, has been described as the 
Appian Way of America.  Harry Black, writing of the need for the road in 1984, states, 
“Washington said there was no other tie by which the rapidly growing country west of the 
mountains could be held for the Federal Union.”21  Short works such as these agree with the 
established historiography that the early proponents feared disunion due to the mountains and 
secession. 
 The latest addition to the historiography is Theodore Sky’s The National Road and the 
Difficult Path to Sustainable National Investment, published in 2011.22   Sky’s book was written 
to mark the 200th anniversary of the National Road.  This scholarly work uses political and 
economic lenses to analyze the impact of the road on the nation.  He provides a general history 
                                                           
19 Lee Burns, “The National Road In Indiana” Indiana Historical Society Publications 7, No. 4 (1919), 211. 
20 Norris F. Schneider, The National Road: Main Street of America (Columbus: Ohio Historical Society, 1975) all 
pages. 
21 Harry Black, Pictorial Americana: The National Road (Hammond, IN: HMB Publications, 1984), 19. 
22 Theodore Sky, The National Road, all pages. 
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of the road, but his emphasis is on the political history.  His analysis is more in-depth than many 
of the other works.  He describes Thomas Jefferson’s quandary of his value conflict of the 
Democratic-Republican belief in limited federal government with his equally important belief in 
the need to support the badly needed internal improvements.  Sky’s work continues through the 
further administrations as Madison, Monroe, Adams and Jackson struggle with the questions of 
federal funding and control.  These questions continued to be an issue of the constitutional limits 
on federal power.   
Sky’s work stands out from the rest of the historiography as he briefly challenges the idea 
of the road unifying the nation.  He asks, “Was this vision of national unity achieved through a 
transportation artery real or mythical?”23  With his conclusion being, “if the national unity that 
Jefferson and his successors so fervently invoked through the powerful symbol of the National 
Road – sometimes eluded them, it was not because they failed to seek it or to appreciate the 
blessings that it would bring to their America.  For them, despite the tension and the limited 
duration of the road as a federal enterprise, it stood as a symbol of unity achieved and yet to be 
achieved.”24  Sky and the other principal writers of the historiography of the National Road agree 
that the history of the road must include its role in unifying the nation.   
There is no disputing the geographic challenge presented by the mountains.  The Appalachians 
severely restricted transportation for emigration, commerce, communication and military 
response.  As to the political challenges to national unity, most of the historiography of the 
National Road presents the views of the key proponents.  They cite the same or similar 
statements that describe how that the road was needed to mitigate disunion.  The historiography 
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agrees that the proponents were sincere in their concern for the nation.  If the proponents used 
alarmist rhetoric, it was because they believed they had good cause for their alarm. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Corduroy Timber from National Road in Illinois (National Road Interpretive Center; 
Vandalia, IL). 
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Chapter 2: George Washington, Perspective of a Leader 
 
  George Washington, as a leader, had a unique perspective on the Trans-
Appalachian territory.  As a native of Virginia, his state claimed much of the territory west of the 
mountains.  His early life was spent as a surveyor, giving him an eye trained to study the 
topography of the land.  In 1753 at the age of twenty-one, he was a colonial British officer.  In 
one of his first assignments, he commanded an expedition to deliver a message to the French 
commander at Fort Le Boeuf in the northwest corner of Pennsylvania near modern day Erie.  He 
crossed the mountains again in 1754 at the beginning of the Seven-Years War.  This time he 
engaged the French in battle and was captured at Fort Necessity in southwest Pennsylvania.  He 
was with the Braddock expedition as they cut the road across the mountains of Pennsylvania in 
1755.  In 1758, he again crossed the mountains in the military action against the French at Fort 
Duquesne at modern day Pittsburgh.  Washington had crossed the mountains of Pennsylvania no 
less than four times in five years.  By the time he was appointed Commander in Chief of the 
American forces during the Revolutionary War, Washington had developed a solid 
understanding of the difficulties in moving troops through hard terrain.  As a surveyor, soldier, 
and political leader, Washington’s training and experience contributed to his advocacy for a road 
through the mountains as an agency of national unity. 
 Washington, in his much quoted 1784 letter to Harrison noted “…that the flanks and rear 
of the United States are possessed by other powers - and formidable ones, too…”1  The timing of 
this letter in 1784 is significant.  It follows Washington and Gallatin’s tour of the Trans-
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Alleghany region and the events of western territories of that year.  At the time of this letter, the 
Southwest Territory, south of the Ohio River was much more populated that was the area north 
of the river.  Washington understood the territorial threats posed by the British and Spain as well 
as the Native American nations.  He also understood that the people of the western lands were 
accustomed to looking to their own local authority and communities for direction.  Paul Fink 
notes this stating, “A Federal Constitution had not yet been adopted, and the people of the West 
had no illusions as to the strength of the government.  During the Revolution they had received 
no aid from Congress, neither men nor money, for protection against incursions by hostile 
Indians, incited by British agents. On the contrary, they themselves with their long rifles and at 
their own expense, had acted as the rear-guard of the Revolution.”2   
During the war, the Americans living in the southern colonies had been deeply divided 
between Loyalist and Patriot factions.  The Battle of Waxhams in western South Carolina in May 
of 1780 energized this divide.  The British, under commander Banastre Tarleton, massacred 
patriot soldiers who threw down their weapons and attempted to surrender.  The backlash of the 
massacre was disastrous for the British who were dependent on the support of the local 
communities.  In October of that year, the Patriot Militia retaliated as they crushed the British 
Loyalist Militia at the Battle of King’s Mountain with the rallying cry of “Tarleton’s Quarter.”  
This battle ended the British 1780 Carolina campaign under Cornwallis, impacting the whole 
course of the war.  There remained deep animosity towards the British.  The people of the 
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southwest were not likely to look to the British, but with their sense of local authority, they could 
turn to Spain. 
The Cessation Act of 1784 resulted in the eastern states turning their western territories 
over the administration of the federal government.  The nation was organized at that time under 
the Articles of Confederation, as the United States Constitution would not be adopted until 1788.  
The limited funds and authority of the federal government under the Articles limited its ability to 
function at all, let alone administer the western territories.  The States of Virginia, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania and New York may have extended their governmental protection and 
services to the western territories.  The federal government, limited by the Articles of 
Confederation, did not.    
In this same year of 1784, the western region provided an example of local authority.  A 
faction in this back country, in what was originally part of North Carolina, and today is located 
in eastern Tennessee, despaired of getting assistance for protection or rights of navigation from 
the federal government.  Instead, they formed what they called the State of Franklin.  This 
political entity was composed of eight counties of the Washington District located in territory 
that North Carolina had turned over to the federal government in the 1784 Cessation Act.  The 
separatists of this region originally intended for this collection of counties to become the 
fourteenth state of the union.  Later on, a faction proclaimed Franklin as a completely 
autonomous nation, with its own governor and constitution.  The area witnessed sharp conflict 
between this separatist faction and those who retained their national loyalty.  North Carolina 
responded by rescinding their cessation of the territory to the national government and 
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reassumed control of these counties.  By the first part of March 1788, the North Carolina militia 
had arrested the Franklin governor John Sevier and quickly reasserted control over the territory.   
Washington’s letter also noted that Spain could be a threat to national unity of the 
western territories.  Spain, as an ally of France, had a better reputation in the west, as Spain had 
assisted the Americans in their war for independence. Spain did retain claims to lands on the 
eastern banks of the Mississippi, as well as possessing the port of New Orleans and the Louisiana 
Territory.  Spain also was concerned with the growing presence and strength of the United 
States.  Spain sought to contain this growth by restricting navigation of the Mississippi, arming 
and encouraging Native American resistance, and encouraging American emigrants to settle in 
Spanish territory.  Spain still had a stronger military presence in the Mississippi Valley than did 
the Americans.  Spain controlled the port city of New Orleans and also had an established, 
prominent trade center in the city of St. Louis at the confluence of the Mississippi and Missouri 
Rivers.  In 1780 during the Revolutionary War, the British had sent a force against St. Louis and 
Cahokia on the Mississippi River.  The British were defeated at both points.  In 1781, the 
Spanish retaliated across the Illinois Territory, successfully raiding a British outpost at the 
southern end of Lake Superior.  Spain had proved that they had the strongest military presence in 
the Mississippi Valley.   
An early settler in the Northwest Territory, John Reynolds, mentioned the strong Spanish 
presence in his personal memoirs.  Reynolds related how his family in 1800 considered settling 
west of the Mississippi. He states, “The Spanish Government, to afford protection to their 
frontiers from the Indians and the British in Canada, encouraged the Americans to emigrate and 
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settle in their domains, west of the Mississippi.”3  Spain was the powerhouse in the Mississippi 
Valley.  As such, they were in the best position to offer governmental services and protection to 
the settlers.  Spain also appealed to American settlers with the offer of land to those who would 
emigrate to their territory.  An even greater incentive to settle west of the Mississippi was that 
Spain also controlled the city and port of New Orleans.  Spanish subjects could ship their 
products to international markets down the Mississippi and through New Orleans.  Americans 
could only export their products over the mountains by pack train to the east.   
Though Spain was reluctant to take direct action against the Americans, they were open 
to dealing with American traitors.  Following the collapse of the State of Franklin, some of the 
involved parties did look to Spain as Washington had feared.  At one point in the late 1780’s, 
Spain entertained the conspirators who sought to detach the territory that had been the State of 
Franklin from the United States and align it with Spain.  This incident is known as the Spanish 
Conspiracy.  If successful, it would have extended Spanish control to the eastern point of the 
current state of Tennessee.  This area, south of the Cumberland Gap, bordered Daniel Boone’s 
Wilderness Road.  Boone’s road was the main access point at that time across the southern 
Appalachian Mountains.  Not only would Spain control territory up to the mountains, they could 
also put pressure on passage through the Cumberland Gap and the Wilderness Road.  The 
Northwest Territories would then be even more landlocked with the British to the north, Spain to 
the south as well as the west, and the Appalachian Mountains to the east.   
The Spanish conspiracy was instigated by a doctor and former North Carolina 
congressman, James White. Kentucky statesman and military leader James Wilkerson was also 
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known to have secretly sworn fealty to the Spanish Crown.  The reasons for the intrigue were 
based on several factors.  Certainly, those involved were looking to advance their own personal 
interests.  Other reasons include certain Tennessee River valley bottom lands that were coveted 
by land speculators.  These lands were claimed by Native American nations, a claim honored by 
the United States.  If the conspirators could attach this land to Spain, they could claim these rich 
bottom lands.  Another factor was Spanish protection against conflict with the Native American 
nations who claimed these lands.  Up to this point, Spain had provided weapons to the Native 
Americans who were attempting to check American emigration.  An alliance with Spain would 
turn an antagonist into an ally. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for Spanish control of the area would be that the region 
could ship exports down the Mississippi River and through the port of New Orleans.  As Kevin 
Barksdale states, “Eastern political leaders opposed to opening the Mississippi River to 
American commercial traffic argued that it would further escalate the tremendously expensive 
Indian wars, result in the loss of tax revenue, and could sever the United States into two 
competing sections.”4  This again illustrates the fear held by eastern leaders of a national schism 
along the mountains.  Rather than pressure Spain to open the Mississippi River and the port of 
New Orleans, the eastern leadership deemed it wiser to keep the Trans-Appalachian region 
accessible only through the mountainous trails.  This strategy of the eastern politicians 
antagonized the western settlers.  If it were to backfire, the people of the western settlements 
could choose to look to Spain instead of the United States. 
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Washington’s concern regarding the western settlers looking south to Spain could have 
been tempered by several factors.  There were several aspects of Spanish Louisiana that had 
prevented even more emigration prior to these events.  The Spanish control of the lower 
Mississippi and treatment of Americans had caused some hard feelings.  Edwin Sparks relates 
one example “Thomas Amis, a North Carolina trader, in 1786, had ventured in a flatboat, loaded 
with small wares, down the Mississippi river below the Spanish boundary line.  He was seized 
and imprisoned; his goods were confiscated; and he was at length turned loose to tramp his 
weary way back to his home…He left a trail of hostility to Spain all along his journey.”5  Such 
treatment of American traders caused long lasting resentment towards the Spanish. 
Many American settlers did cross the Mississippi River to settle in the Spanish held 
Louisiana Territory.  This migration across the Mississippi slowed considerably by 1795 due to 
several factors.  In this year, the Pickney treaty finally opened the port of New Orleans to 
American shipping.  This year also marked the end of the Northwest Indian Wars. This war 
started ominously for the United States as General St. Clair suffered a disastrous defeat at the 
Battle of the Wabash of 1791.  St. Clair’s losses of over ninety percent of his force had set an 
ominous tone for future of western emigration.  Three years later, General “Mad Anthony” 
Wayne’s victory at the 1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers was the deciding battle.  The ensuing 1795 
Treaty of Greenville resulted in Native American Nations ceding large amounts of territory for 
American emigration.  With the Native Americans defeated, and the Mississippi open to 
shipping, the Spanish threat was generally mitigated. 
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   There were other reasons why more emigrants did not settle in Spanish territory.  As with 
Britain, Spain was a monarchy.  Freedom loving, independent Americans took their liberty and 
self-determination seriously.  They did not want to return to the status of being a subject of a 
European monarch.  Reynolds, again from his memoirs, states one further important reason why 
some refused to settle in Spanish lands.  His family and many others decided to settle in the 
Northwest Territory on the east side of the Mississippi.  He states “In the permit to settle in the 
Domains of Spain, it was required that my father should raise his children in the Roman Catholic 
Church.  This pledge was a requisition of the Government in all cases, and my father refused to 
agree to it.”6  The question of religion was too much for many of the Protestant settlers.  While 
some may have been willing to offer at least a tepid allegiance to the Spanish King, they were 
not willing to convert to Catholicism.  In spite of these objections, Spain posed problems for the 
southwest territories.  While the British had limited influence south of the Ohio River, they were 
still a concern in the Northwest Territories. 
Washington’s letter noted his fear that the westerners might look to the British in the 
north.  While the settlers in the Southwestern Territory still held a great deal of animosity from 
the war, the British had limited military operations in the Northwest Territories.  Unlike the 
Spanish, the British and the Americans shared a common heritage and language.  Washington’s 
fears of Americans joining with the British was certainly justified as some communities in New 
England looked favorably towards the north.  Washington himself had been betrayed by his 
general Benedict Arnold who had defected to the British in 1780, again just four years prior to 
this letter.  Arnold had distinguished himself as a Patriot General in the Battle of Saratoga in 
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1777 that ended Burgoyne’s campaign in New York.  Previous to this battle Arnold had joined 
with Ethan Allen to take Fort Ticonderoga in 1775.  Arnold defected during the Revolutionary 
War.  Following the war, Vermont’s Ethan Allen and his brothers Ira and Levi also looked north 
towards the British in Canada. 
Before becoming the fourteenth state in 1791, the Vermont Republic was divided over 
the question of its becoming a part of the United States or of its joining with Canada.  Vermont, 
like the Trans-Appalachian region, was separated from eastern ports by difficult mountainous 
terrain.  It was easier for Vermont farmers to ship their produce north by water on Lake 
Champlain to the British controlled St Lawrence River.  S.F. Bemis describes the situation, “The 
position of Vermont in this respect closely resembles the relation of the Kentucky and Tennessee 
settlements to the closure of the Mississippi Navigation, and was productive of much the same 
result…a strong party in the Sovereign State of Vermont was against joining the Union, and 
favored an alliance with Great Britain, or even return to British Rule.”7   Levi Allen, brother of 
Ethan,  even went to London to pursue an alliance between Vermont and Great Britain.  London 
was cool to the Allen brothers and their faction, preferring to be cautious with the Americas due 
to a Pacific Coast incident with Spain at the time of Levi’s visit.  The actions of the former 
Patriot commanders Arnold and Allen demonstrate how some who had been known patriots 
could choose to side with the British. 
Washington’s concern of the westerner settlers looking to the British could be tempered 
by a better understanding of the western view.  John Reynolds, in his memoirs of Illinois, 
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provides insights such as at a shooting match in 1804.  He states “Aged matrons frequently 
attended these shooting matches, with a neat clean keg of metheglin to sell…The old lady often 
had her knitting or sewing with her and would relate horrid stories of the Tories in the 
Revolution in North Carolina, as well as to sell her drink.”8  Settlers had come from many areas, 
including the southwest, bringing the southwestern British resentment with them.  Reynold’s 
narrative appears to make such sentiments acceptable to settlers at the turn of the century.  In 
addition to lingering resentment from the war, the people of the Northwest Territories resented 
British forts on land that was ceded to the Americans in the Treaty of Paris.  The British were 
also known to furnish arms to the Native Americans.  This was a particular point of resentment 
before the end of the Northwest Indian War.  Washington did have cause to be concerned about 
Americans looking to the British, but this was a more likely threat in Federalist New England 
than it was in the western territories.   
Washington served as the first president of the United States from 1789 to 1797.  The 
three states of Vermont, Kentucky and Tennessee, with their histories of domestic and 
international intrigues, had all achieved statehood and joined the Union under his administration.  
During his terms of office, the western territories surged with emigrants, including many from 
Europe.  The Northwest Indian Wars had resulted in considerable mitigation of the Native 
American threat to the settlers.  The Pickney Treaty had opened the lower Mississippi and the 
port of New Orleans to American shipping.  Even without the National Road, by the end of his 
presidency, the western territories had become securely attached to the nation.  Washington died 
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in December of 1799, just a few years before the nation acted on his dream of a road through the 
mountains. 
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Chapter 3: Albert Gallatin, Perspective of a Problem Solver 
 
 
 Three of the four main proponents of the National Road, George Washington, Thomas 
Jefferson, and even the Senator from Kentucky Henry Clay, were from the eastern portion of 
Virginia.  The fourth, Albert Gallatin, was a Swiss immigrant from Geneva.  He was born into a 
well to do family, though orphaned at an early age.  As a student at the Academy of Geneva, he 
was influenced by the works of Voltaire and Rousseau.  Henry Adams notes his aptitude as a 
student stating, “With minds in this process of youthful fermentation, they came out into the 
world.  Albert was graduated in May, 1779, first in his class in mathematics, natural philosophy, 
and Latin translation.”1  With this background, aptitude, and education, Gallatin, accompanied 
by his friend Serre, decided to leave Geneva and make their way in the United States. 
 Gallatin at first spent some time in New England.  He struggled to make ends meet by 
trading in merchandise and teaching French.  Gallatin however found the New England 
Federalism and society distasteful.  Edwin Burrows notes, “Gallatin’s almost instinctive 
antipathy to New England is a matter of more than passing interest.  On the one hand, it clarifies 
his decision over the next few years to settle in western Pennsylvania.  On the other, it seems in 
no way to anticipate his emergence, a decade or so later, as a key figure in the Jeffersonian 
movement.”2  
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Gallatin became involved in western Pennsylvania politics, serving in the Pennsylvania 
Assembly.  Early in his political career, he was aware of the challenge posed to his state by the 
lack of good roads.  Raymond Walters describes this stating, “As he jogged on horseback along 
the rough roads and mountain trails that connected his back-country home to the state capital to 
attend session of the legislature, Gallatin had ample opportunity to reflect on a need keenly felt 
by all Westerners – better means of transportation.”3  Later, Gallatin represented Pennsylvania in 
the U.S. Senate and House.  His political position was as a Democratic-Republican.  While 
generally aligned with Jefferson, his genius was in his ability to find a pragmatic middle ground 
between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans. 
Gallatin’s choice of western Pennsylvania placed him at the heart of an early American 
conflict.  As Michael Hostetler states the situation, “Against great odds independence had been 
won, but at a great cost.  At war’s end, the former colonies were politically disunited, indebted, 
and geographically isolated.”4  In the west, the lack of specie put severe financial strains on the 
settlers.  Most of the money in circulation was held by the wealthy in eastern cities.  In 1786, the 
per capita cash on hand was $1.88, dropping to $0.31 in 1790.5  The disproportionate amounts of 
available specie caused widespread foreclosures.  This led the western settlers to the conclusion 
that the policies of the Federalist leaders and the National Bank were enriching the few at the 
expense of the many.   
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Some in western Pennsylvania responded by exercising their belief, based on the wording 
of the Pennsylvania Constitution, that they had the right to resist such injustices.6 They 
responded by attempting to thwart the foreclosure and collections.  Terry Bouton describes many 
of the strategies they employed:  Sheriffs and magistrates would refuse to act on court writs; The 
members of a community would make roads impassable so that collections agents would not be 
able to seize property; They would also turn out in force at auctions and prevent bids.  Even if 
someone did buy seized goods, they would not be able to transport them on the blocked roads. 
With the passing of the United States Constitution in 1787, the federal government had 
more power than was held under the Articles of Confederation.  The sheriffs and magistrates 
could now be held accountable for their failure to act.  As tensions grew, conflict was sparked by 
a new excise tax on whiskey.  This tax would be used to pay interest on war bonds, held by the 
wealthy eastern investors.  Many of these bonds had been purchased by wealthy speculators at 
well below face value, but these new bond holders were demanding the government pay interest 
on the full-face value of the bond.   
This tax hit the western settlers hard, as whiskey was their most profitable export.  A 
pack horse could only haul so much weight through the mountain trails.  A horse loaded with 
grain would bring little profit.  If the grain were converted to whiskey, the profits would be 
greater.  The new federal tax on whiskey ate up these meager profits, leading some to take firmer 
action.  Boulton describes how collections agents were treated as had those during the Stamp Act 
protests against the British in 1765.  Some collection agents were relieved of their collected taxes 
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as well as their ledgers.  Some were tarred and feathered and otherwise abused.  Finally, some 
Whiskey Rebels even assembled as local militias in Braddock’s Field and marched in Pittsburgh. 
This conflict, known as The Whiskey Rebellion, was not limited to western Pennsylvania.  
Marco Sioli notes, “The same kind of protest was spreading in the Virginia and North Carolina 
backcountry and in Kentucky.”7  President George Washington weighed several options on how 
best to respond and decided on firm action.  He took the field with government militia troops and 
quickly restored order.  In the face of overwhelming government power, the Whiskey Rebels 
abandoned their cause and returned to their homes.  The leaders were tried and convicted of 
treason.  While they willingly admitted to rioting, they firmly denied the charge of treason.  They 
believed they were patriots, acting within their rights as citizens to oppose what they saw as 
unjust government overreach.   
The Whiskey Rebellion was actually a practical exercise in the question of the citizen’s 
rights versus government authority.  Saul Cornell describes the rebellion as “popular 
constitutionalism” and “plebeian radicalism” with the local militia acting as an agent of the local 
community.  This was another Trans-Appalachian example of local authority, but this time it 
came in conflict with a stronger federal government.  Cornell concludes “Whether framed as a 
direct challenge to federal power or conceptualized as a passive veto, the notion that the militia 
might serve as check on unjust federal policies remained a latent force to be reckoned with in 
early American constitutionalism.”8  Gallatin as a local political leader, was at the epicenter of 
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the rebellion.  His response to the crises would set the pattern of his later contribution to the 
National Road. 
The 1787 debate on the United States Constitution faced many issues, among these was 
that of national unity.  Traditional political theory held that self-government could not work over 
a large territory.  People separated by distance would not be able to function as a political body.  
James Madison in his 1787 essay The Federalist No. 14 addressed this question while arguing 
for the advantages of a Republic versus a Democracy for the governing of such a territory.  
Madison stated “We have seen the necessity of the union as our bulwark against foreign danger, 
as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other 
common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted 
the liberties of the old world, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have 
proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed 
by our own.”9   
Gallatin, like Madison, was a staunch supporter of the Union.  Both saw the Union, not as 
a threat to plebian liberty, but as the vital element which guaranteed this liberty.  Without the 
strength that comes from a unified nation, the country would face dissolution, and the parts 
would fall prey to other powers.  Gallatin was a voice of moderation during the Whiskey Tax 
conflict.  Gallatin, like many of the Democratic-Republicans, saw the whiskey tax as unjust, but 
was against armed resistance.  He urged his fellow citizens to resort to their existing right under 
law to bring their grievance to the floor of Congress through their representative government.  
The power to change what they perceived to be an unjust law is through urging change or repeal 
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of the law, not in armed resistance.  The option of rebellion was only to be used as a last resort, 
not while legal avenues were still available.  Gallatin’s words proved prophetic as just a few 
years later what has been called the Revolution of 1800 replaced Federalist John Adams with the 
Democratic-Republican candidate Thomas Jefferson, partly due to the votes of the western 
settlers. 
In 1801, Jefferson selected Gallatin to serve as his Secretary of the Treasury.  As such, 
Gallatin played an early role in the story of the National Road.  His presence as a political leader 
in western Pennsylvania during the Whiskey Rebellion may have tainted him.  Federalists were 
reluctant to confirm his appointment, so it was delayed until late in the year.  However, his 
training and experience had prepared him for this role.  This included his upbringing and 
education in Europe, his work as a surveyor with Washington in the 1784 Trans-Allegheny 
region, and his experience as a state and national politician.  His pragmatic approach and ability 
to find common ground enabled him to promote resolutions for this important transportation 
project.   
Gallatin’s service as a legislator from western Pennsylvania was a constant reminder of 
the need for the road as he had made regular trips across the mountains to the Congress in 
Philadelphia.  In January 1801, he made the journey to the new national capital in Washington.  
His journey to the new capital has been described as “Gallatin was late in arriving.  Delayed by 
personal business, and then detained en route by rain and snow, he finally entered the new capital 
on January 12, 1801, a very cold, and weary traveler.”10  In his new role as Secretary of the 
Treasury, he could use his influence and talents to promote a road to the west. 
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Perhaps because western Pennsylvania was a difficult journey, Gallatin took an unusual 
step for a member of the Cabinet and moved into a house in Washington.  This worked to his 
advantage as Mannix notes, “Because Gallatin was the only member of the Cabinet living near 
the Capitol, this house naturally became, in the evenings, a center of entertainment and 
discussion, one of the chief links between the White House and the administration supporters of 
Congress.”11  Gallatin maintained his house year-round, even when Congress recessed for the 
summer and others left the city.  As the only cabinet minister in town, he would frequently 
handle routine government duties while forwarding more important matters to the President.12  In 
his own way, preferring quiet conversation to speechmaking and society functions, Gallatin was 
able to influence the direction of the nation. 
Gallatin became a cabinet member at a critical time in the nation’s development.  The 
nation was sharply divided into Federalist and Democratic-Republican factions, with opposing 
visions of the course of the new nation.  Gallatin was primarily a unionist.  He put national unity 
above party affiliation.  Rozann Rothman says of him, “An understanding of Gallatin begins with 
the recognition that conciliation of at times conflicting objectives was his primary goal.”13  
Rothman also notes how Gallatin worked to bring the two factions together, stating, “Gallatin is 
able to find a middle ground between Hamilton and Jefferson, which as will be shown is in 
certain respects a new ground.”14  
 Gallatin had urged those protesting the Whiskey tax to preserve the union, and address 
their complaints through their rights as citizens.  He likewise urged warring political factions to 
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maintain unity, as this was the only way to preserve liberty.  Rothmann concludes, “Gallatin’s 
position was consistent.  Both in writings and in his actions, he attempted to harmonize the at 
times conflicting principles of republicanism and nationalism.  When he could balance these 
principles, the result was an indestructible Union composed of indestructible states.”15  The 
quiet, analytical Swiss emigrant, who enjoyed evenings at home in quiet conversation, was to 
become an agent of unity and progress in a new and sharply divided nation.  Among Gallatin’s 
achievements was infrastructure and transportation networks such as the National Road. 
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Figure 2: Madonna of the Trail Statue at the Old Illinois State House on Gallatin Street in 
Vandalia, IL. 
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Chapter 4: Thomas Jefferson, Perspective of a Visionary 
  
Thomas Jefferson had a vision for the United States.  His ideal was that of an agrarian 
nation, composed of communities of family farms expanding westward.  The people of the 
nation living in a republic, governed by the strong states and a limited federal government.  The 
Democratic-Republican view has been expressed as “Personal freedom, human development, 
and republican virtue, they believed, were most likely to be found in an agrarian ‘democratic’ 
republic. Where government increasingly becomes the province of the few (and wealthy), 
popular government is remade into tyranny.”1  This view was in contrast with that of the 
Federalists who wanted a stronger central government.  In 1800, the voters chose Jefferson over 
the Federalist Adams, and the Democratic-Republicans were in power. 
Jefferson had a long history with the Trans-Appalachian territory.  He served as Governor 
of Virginia, including the state’s trans-Appalachian western territory, from June 1878 until June 
1881.  After this, he was a Virginia delegate to the Congress of the Confederation from 
November in 1783 to May in 1784.  During this time in Congress, he was instrumental in writing 
the Land Ordinance of 1784.  This was the first ordinance that would later evolve into the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  In the 1784 ordinance, Jefferson demonstrates his concern for 
national unity as he lists his conditions for the territories “First: That they shall for ever remain a 
part of this confederacy of the United States of America.”2  Other points address how the 
territories are to be taxed and governed, but national unity tops the list. 
                                                           
1 Raymond B. Wrabley Jr. “Nation-Building and the Presidency: Competing National Visions at the Founding,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 22, no. 2, (Spring, 1992): 270. 
2 Report from the Committee for the Western Territory to the United States Congress, March 01, 1784. 
43 
 
 
 
After his term in Congress, Jefferson was the United States Minister to France from May 
1885 to September 1889.  This placed him in Paris at the beginning of the French Revolution.  
He was present in France when the Bastille fell.  This then, was the second time that Jefferson 
was present at a national revolution.  Jefferson, like the Swiss born Gallatin, had first-hand 
observation of how mountainous geography marked natural lines for political states.  Mountain 
chains like the Alps and the Pyrenees marked the separation of nations.  During this time in 
Europe, he wrote a letter to James Madison in 1787.  In this letter Jefferson speaks as if the 
separation of the United States was likewise inevitable along the mountainous divide.  Writing 
about the issue of allowing Spain to maintain control of the Mississippi, he states, “And I will 
venture to say that the act which abandons the navigation of the Mississippi is an act of 
separation between the Eastern & Western country…If they declare themselves a separate 
people, we are incapable of a single effort to retain them.”3  Jefferson’s concerns for national 
unity can be traced to these documents well before when he became president. 
The election of 1800 was marked by conflict.  There were four candidates; the 
Democratic-Republican candidates were Arron Burr and John Adams’ Vice President Thomas 
Jefferson. The two Federalists were President John Adams, who was running for reelection, and 
Charles Pinckney.  As in 1796, these candidates were not running as a President and Vice 
President team.  The candidate with the most electoral votes would be President, and the 
candidate with the next highest vote count would be Vice President, regardless of party 
affiliation.  In 1800, Jefferson and Burr tied with 73 electoral votes.  The election was 
determined by the House of Representatives.  There were sixteen states in the Union in 1800, and 
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each state had one vote.  The eight Democratic-Republican states voted for Jefferson.  
Federalists, who saw Jefferson as a greater threat to their party and to the nation, cast their eight 
votes for Burr.   
The election itself began to produce grumblings of secession and disunion.  Democratic-
Republicans saw Federalist manipulation as an attempt to hold onto power.  As Joanne Freeman 
notes, “Contrary to Jefferson's rather rosy depiction of its resolution, there was talk of disunion 
and civil war, and indeed, two states began to organize their militia to seize the government for 
Jefferson if Burr prevailed.”4  This political unrest signaled danger for the Federalists.  
Alexander Hamilton, a long-time opponent of Burr, finally urged the selection of Jefferson.  By 
1803, the Twelfth Amendment had changed the process of electing the President and Vice 
President to these persons running as a team.  Jefferson became President having first-hand 
experience of two revolutions, those of America and France.  He had been Governor of a state 
with Trans-Appalachian territories.  He had spent time in Europe with its geographically marked 
borders.  Jefferson had considered the danger of such a national split in the United States.  Now, 
as he took office, even his own election was marked by grumblings of disunion. 
In his first term of office, Jefferson was faced with a new threat to national unity.  At the 
turn of the 19th century, France was becoming a powerhouse in Europe, as Spanish power was 
beginning to wane.  On October 1, 1800, a new international threat the Trans-Appalachian region 
remerged as France and Spain traded territories in the Third Treaty of San Ildefonso.  Under the 
terms of this treaty, Spain returned New Orleans and the Louisiana Territory to France.  This 
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transaction was sure to cause concern for Jefferson and other leaders for a number of reasons.  
Sparks states this as “The rise of Napoleon had startled the world…The news that he had 
obtained from Spain the Louisiana country produced a powerful effect on America…Indeed, 
Louisiana might become a starting point for the spread of Napoleonic power over all America.”5  
Spain had been struggling to hold territory, France was still expanding. 
Unlike Spain, the French were less likely to force Catholicism on their American 
subjects.  The Reign of Terror of the French Revolution had not spared the power of the Church.  
The Spanish crown had been a champion for the Church, but the revolutionary French had 
worked to disenfranchise the Church of land and power.  In effect, the revolution had to a degree 
de-Christianized France.  American settlers who balked at Spanish insistence of Catholic 
conversion might be more agreeable to French oversight.   
 The French, as a people and as a nation, were esteemed by the western settlers.  The 
French, after all, were fellow revolutionaries.  The Americans were grateful for French assistance 
in the American Revolution.  Place names in the Northwest Territory honor those Frenchmen 
who had assisted the American war.  These include as Lafayette and his fellow French military 
leaders Dubois and Fayette.  Across the Mississippi were the cities of St. Louis and St. 
Genevieve.  The western shore retained the French influence from earlier settlement.  The 
Mississippi Valley was also home to French Acadian communities.  The Acadians were French 
settlers from eastern Canada and the Maritimes.  They had migrated to the Louisiana Territory 
following the Seven Years War in 1763.  When the British took possession of Canada, they 
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displaced the Acadians into their other North American colonies.  Rather than live under British 
rule, the Acadians made their way to French Louisiana.  Only when they arrived and settled in 
the new land did they discover that the Louisiana Territory had been secretly ceded to Spain by 
the Treaty of Fontainebleau of 1762. 
 The Spanish governor did not actually arrive to assume power in New Orleans until 1766.  
By this time, the French refused to accept Spanish authority.  The Acadians rebelled against the 
Spanish Governor and drove him away.  Instead of becoming Spanish subjects, they offered their 
allegiance to the French king.  The leaders of the Louisiana Rebellion claimed this as the right to 
self-determination, antedating Thomas Paine and the American Revolution by several years.  
Unfortunately for the Acadian rebellion, Spain returned in force, executed the leaders of the 
rebellion, and asserted control.  The Acadians lived under Spanish rule, but they maintained their 
own communities.  Now in 1800, Jefferson might have wondered how they and the other settlers 
would react to the return of France to the western territory.  The Louisiana French might induce 
the American settlers to choose self-determination and align themselves with France.  Through 
appeal, coercion or force, the whole Mississippi Valley from the Appalachians to the Rockies 
could become French Territory. 
 Napoleon did have aspirations for a North American empire.  In 1801 he sent a military 
force to secure the city of New Orleans.  Jefferson responded by sending Robert Livingston to 
France in an attempt to purchase New Orleans.  The Spanish, meanwhile, delayed completing the 
transaction of ceding the territory to France.  As Spain delayed the transfer of the Louisiana 
Territory to France, Napoleon’s North American ambitions ended in disaster.  His attempts to 
quell the slave uprising in Haiti ended in defeat, with great loss of his army.  Faced with this 
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western defeat and a new war with Britain, Napoleon chose to sell the Louisiana Territory to the 
United States.  Spain finalized the transfer of the territory to France on November 30, 1803, and 
France completed the sale to the United States on December 20 three weeks later.  This sale of 
the Louisiana Territory ended the international threats to the western territory.  Rather than 
Britain or Spain, the French control of the Louisiana Territory would have been the greatest 
international threat to Trans-Appalachian unity. 
In 1804, Jefferson won reelection with his running-mate and new Vice President George 
Clinton.  In 1805, Jefferson had a new reason to fear disunion, accusing his political opponent 
and former vice president Burr as an agent of disunion.  Following his famous duel with 
Alexander Hamilton, Aaron Burr relocated to the western territories.  There Burr joined with 
Kentucky leader James Wilkerson, who had survived his past involvement with Spain.  Burr and 
Wilkinson were accused of being involved in a new intrigue.  Most likely these two were 
plotting a filibustering campaign against Spanish control of the lower Mississippi.   
When their movements were discovered, Wilkerson ended up denouncing Burr.  Thomas 
Jefferson aggressively pursued a charge of treason.  Jefferson explained his reasoning in an 
address to Congress stating, “Agreeably to the request of the House of Representatives, 
communicated in their resolution of the sixteenth instant, I proceed to state under the reserve 
therein expressed, information received touching an illegal combination of private individuals 
against the peace and safety of the Union, and, a military expedition planned by them against the 
territories of a power in amity with the United States, with the measures I have pursued for 
suppressing the same.”6  Burr of course was cleared of treason.  Much of the evidence against 
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Burr was from Wilkinson whose evidence was based on a document in Wilkinson’s own hand 
that he claimed was copied from Burr’s papers.  James Lewis, in his book on the Burr 
Conspiracy states, “More recent works have generally accepted that Burr never intended to 
divide the union and that no threat existed.  Evidence for Burr’s intentions is too ambiguous, 
incomplete, and conflicting to draw solid conclusions.  And the fact that his projects never 
matured places an assessment of their threat in the realm of counterfactual speculation.”7  
History has been kinder to Aaron Burr than to James Wilkinson on the topic of loyalty and 
intrigue.  Jefferson used the Burr plot as evidence of the danger of intrigues leading to possible 
disunion and the need to “cement” the nation together. 
Washington and Gallatin had agreed on the need to link the eastern waters to the Ohio 
River.  Jefferson and Gallatin continued this vision.  A number of significant events during the 
Jefferson Administration worked to help make the road a reality.  The 1802 petition for Ohio 
statehood had provided the means as Congress agreed with Gallatin’s plan to use a portion of the 
funds from the sale of Federal lands to finance the project.  In 1803, just twenty years after the 
acquisition of the Northwest Territory, the Louisiana Purchase added approximately 828,000,000 
square miles to the nation.  This essentially doubled the nation to slightly larger than all of 
western Europe.  While the Louisiana Purchase finally secured the port of New Orleans, this 
massive amount of new territory raised the level of urgency for infrastructure improvements.  In 
1804, Lewis and Clark began their epic journey up the Missouri River.  In 1805, the Tracy 
Report examined several possible routes to connect the Ohio River with eastern waterways, 
concluding that Fort Cumberland on the Potomac River in Maryland was the most practical point 
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of access.  In 1806, Congress sided with Washington, Gallatin and Jefferson and passed An Act 
to Regulate the Laying Out and Making a Road from Cumberland, in the State of Maryland to 
the State of Ohio.  
Gallatin was the intellectual who analyzed and worked out solutions to the problems of 
internal improvements.  Jefferson used his leadership and vision to garner support.  In 1807, 
Gallatin submitted his comprehensive, national transportation plan entitled Report of the 
Secretary of the Treasury: on the subject of Public Roads and Canals: made in pursuance of a 
Resolution of the Senate, of March 2, 1807.  In his sixth State of the Union address in that same 
year, Jefferson, in a reference to Burr, denounced “private individuals.”  But he praised Lewis 
and Clark for their successful expedition, as well as those led by Zebulon Pike into southern 
Colorado and Thomas Freeman up the Red River.  Jefferson concluded by noting surplus funds 
in the treasury, and he urged Congress to apply these funds to public improvements.  His 
message included, “By these operations new channels of communications will be opened 
between the States, the lines of separation will disappear, their interests will be identified, and 
their union cemented by new and indissoluble ties.”8  Jefferson’s rhetoric, joined with Gallatin’s 
analysis, made Washington’s dream a reality.  Following the Jefferson administration, Gallatin 
remained as Secretary of the Treasury for President Madison, who continued the work on the 
National Road.  In 1811, construction was finally begun at Fort Cumberland.  In 1818, under the 
Monroe Administration, the National Road finally conquered the mountains and reached the 
Ohio River. 
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Chapter 5: Henry Clay, Perspective of a Nation Builder 
 
 Following Jefferson’s presidency and Gallatin’s report, the rhetoric on the 
National Road changed.  Jefferson had spoken of the road as necessary to “cement” the union 
together.  Jefferson’s strong vision and leadership had helped change the political character of 
the nation from John Adam’s Federalism to one along more Republican values.  Now, under 
Madison’s administration, the influence of the developing Republican values resulted in new 
threats to the nation’s stability and unity.  Influential southern politicians such as John Randolph 
of Virginia had a more conservative view of the direction of the nation.  His view, stated as the 
Principles of ’98, believed that the states had the right to reject federal legislation that they 
believed infringed on the rights of the states.  Randolph and others looked to the future, fearing a 
strong central government would dictate policy to the states on issues such as slavery.  Views 
such as these were popular with the anti-Federalist sentiment prevalent outside of New England.  
The American Revolution had freed them from a strong central government.  As Democratic-
Republicans, they were advocates for local and state authority.  The National Road, as a federal 
project, became a target of these conservative Republicans. 
The rhetoric on the National Road changed from how the road was needed to “cement” 
the union to how the road was needed to “preserve” the union.  Rather than foreign or domestic 
threats, the lack of infrastructure itself would lead to disunion.  During Jefferson’s 
administration, the nation had almost doubled in size from 864,746 square miles to 1,681,828.  
This in comparison to Western Europe at 1,583,000 square miles illustrates the vast territory to 
be administered under a republican system of government.  This was a far greater territory than 
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had ever attempted self-government.  This truly was a new self-government experiment on a vast 
scale.  The geographical challenges now became not only the mountains, but the territory itself 
spanning thousands of miles across a continent.   New champions of national unity, a young John 
C. Calhoun and Henry Clay among them, took up the cause for internal transportation networks. 
One of the first instances of the new rhetoric was used by Peter Buell Porter in a speech 
given during the 11th Congress in 1810.1  Buell, a New York Congressman, spoke in support of 
canals linking Atlantic shipping with the Great Lakes.  Much of his speech, like that of Gallatin’s 
reports, addressed the economic advantages of improving infrastructure.  Buell added alarmist 
rhetoric as agency for action by the legislature.  In his speech he described the need for 
infrastructure describing it as “…not only an object of the first consequence to the future 
prosperity of this country, considered as a measure of political economy, but as a measure of 
State policy it is indispensable to the preservation of the integrity of this Government.”2  The 
threat to the Government he identifies as the geographical challenge presented by the 
Appalachians, stating, “This diversity and supposed contrariety of interest and pursuit between 
the people of these two great divisions of country, and the difference of character to which these 
occupations give rise, it has been confidently asserted and is still believed by many, will lead to a 
separation of the United States at no very distant day.”3   
Porter identifies the one, sole way to prevent this division is through links of commerce 
stating, “…it is by promoting this commerce, by promoting and encouraging this intercourse – it 
is by producing a mutual dependence of interests between these two great sections, and by these 
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means only, that the United States can ever be kept together.”4  Michael Hostetler notes this shift 
in the rhetoric as adding a transcendent aspect to the technical arguments.  Hostetler describes 
this shift as “However, it appears that factual data alone lacked the persuasive and motivational 
force needed to provoke action.  The progression of the debate shows that the facts gained 
persuasive power when they were rhetorically joined with broader, more transcendent appeals.”5  
Porter here shifted the rhetoric from infrastructure being necessary for logistics and as an agency 
of unity, to infrastructure being the only option to prevent national disunion.  As John Randolph 
and others were using their influence to check federal authority, Porter used the threat of 
imminent disunion to justify federal spending on transportation. 
 This debate on infrastructure spending then was part of the greater national debate on the 
role of the federal government.  Everyone agreed on the need for interstate infrastructure, but 
fears of a growing federal government, with an elite ruling political class, made it difficult to 
pass funding for transportation projects.  Events during the Madison administration impacted the 
debate on transportation, both for and against.  The Jefferson Embargo Act of 1807, in response 
to British and French infringements on American neutrality caused economic hardship on eastern 
manufacturers.  With no European markets, eastern manufactures desperately needed internal 
transportation networks as an outlet for their wares.  The War of 1812 changed the dynamic on 
the funding for the National Road.  A project like this was seen as generally Federalist 
legislation.  During the war, Federalist manufacturers and exporters in New England were seen 
as sympathetic to the British.  Anti-federalist sentiment fed into the states’ rights faction during 
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and after the war.  On the one hand, as troop movements had been restricted by bad roads, the 
war illustrated the need of improved transportation for national security.  As these opinions and 
factions were being formed, two bills introduced in Congress following the war were to have an 
impact the funding for the National Road. 
 In 1816, the first of these bills brought on a crisis for Congress.  The Compensation Act 
of 1816, simply put, authorized a fifteen hundred annual stipend for members of Congress.  This 
brought on an unexpected surge of resentment from the voters.  The act struck the anti-
Federalists as representative of a wealthy, ruling elite they had feared for so long.  C. Edward 
Skeen reports the voter’s reaction stating, “In the congressional elections of 1816, widespread 
public outrage resulted in the ouster of an unprecedented number of incumbents and served as 
dramatic evidence of declining deference to public officials.”6  About half of the incumbents 
failed to retain their seats.   
Though largely backed by Republicans, the Act was seen as Federalist legislation and the 
Federalists suffered most heavily at the ballot box.  Politicians became acutely aware of their 
tenuous hold on office, and they became much more attune to sentiments back home.  Those who 
managed to hold their seats along with the new members of Congress became more sectional 
than previous legislators had been.  Funding and oversight of the National Road, among other 
issues, had to be presented in a way that would be acceptable to their constituents.  Politicians 
from conservative Republican districts in particular, while in favor of internal improvements, 
were now careful not be labeled as having Federalist sympathies.  Instead of using their own 
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judgment of whether this or that legislation was worthwhile, those in Congress also had to make 
sure they could justify their support with their voters. 
 John C. Calhoun survived the purges of the Compensation Act, and at this point in his 
political career became an advocate for internal improvements.  According to John Larson, 
Calhoun believed “The political health of the republic was at stake, and the experience of the late 
war had shown too well how fragmented and particular were the American people.”7  In addition 
to this fragmented nation, Calhoun was also concerned by the nation’s immense size as John 
Grove notes, “Calhoun was convinced that the greatest threat to political unity and harmony in 
America was the vast extent of territory.”8  In 1817, a new national bank produced a bonus of 
funds.  Encouraged by the windfall, John Calhoun introduced the Bonus Bill.  This bill would 
earmark certain funds from the new bank for internal improvements.  Calhoun proposed these 
funds to “conquer space.”  Calhoun was joined by Henry Clay to fight for the passage of this bill.  
President Madison was also an early supporter of the bill.   
The bill met with resistance from strict southern sectionalists such as Thomas Bolling 
Robertson of Louisiana. The people of Robertson’s district would be taxed for improvements 
like the National Road, while receiving few funds in return.  Though his motives were likely 
sectional, Robertson objected that the bill violated a narrow reading of the Constitution.  Calhoun 
defended the bill with a much broader argument that the Constitution “was meaningful only if it 
facilitated the survival and practice of the government.”9 Sectionalists were able to modify the 
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Bonus Bill so that the funds, rather than being administered on the federal level, would be 
allocated to the states proportionally to their populations.  Madison, though an early proponent of 
the bill, now determined the final version as unconstitutional and vetoed it.  Larson concludes 
Calhoun and Clay’s role as “Earnest nationalists at this juncture, both men wanted to consolidate 
the Union with a system of roads and canals, and they would play the game of politics to achieve 
that end…They genuinely believed that the Union would collapse if its parts were not soon 
forcibly bound together.”10  Calhoun had made the case that as Hostetler states, “restrictions of 
federal jurisdiction written into the Constitution could not possibly be construed in such a way as 
to endanger the union itself.”11  Calhoun’s early views of the union were to change over the next 
few years, but during the Madison Administration, he was a powerful proponent for 
infrastructure projects such as the National Road as a means of preserving the nation. 
Some of the strongest rhetoric for the National Road was spoken by Henry Clay, and at a 
time when western nationalism seemed secure.  Clay was born in eastern Virginia, and his family 
later moved to Lexington Kentucky.  Clay began his political career as a Democratic-
Republican.  Later, as a founder of the Whig Party, he was a proponent of the American System.   
With similarities to the earlier Federalism, this was an economic system that promoted protective 
tariffs, a national bank and infrastructure improvements such as roads and canals.  These tools 
would promote stability for national development, the economy.  Primarily, the American 
System promoted infrastructure to link manufacturing, agriculture for improved internal 
commerce and communication.  The National Road, as an integral part of the infrastructure, 
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received strong backing by Clay and his supporters.  Some of these other supporters of the 
National Road justified it by citing the General Welfare clause in the Preamble of the 
Constitution.  Other constitutional arguments included federal authority for post roads, national 
security and commerce.  Proponents presented a broad view of the Constitution to support the 
National Road, and opponents argued against it with a narrow view of the same document.  Few 
opposed the idea of internal improvements, but the question remained federal versus sectional 
spending and oversight. 
Clay, like Gallatin, believed in the necessity of internal improvements.  Unlike Gallatin’s 
quiet, intellectual analysis, Clay used his great oratory skills.  A contemporary of Clay described 
his speaking ability as “His greatest forte, among various and other eminent qualities, the gift of 
eloquence bestowed on him by nature…A person must be present and hear and see him in some 
of his extraordinary efforts to realize and appreciate his eloquence…The brilliant and illuminated 
countenance of the orator, his eye flashing inspiration, and his tone and gestures, cannot be 
conveyed to others who were not present at the scene.”12  Gallatin’s report contained logical, 
technical arguments for internal improvements.  Clay’s speeches are an example of what 
Hostetler described as “adding a transcendent aspect” to Gallatin’s work. 
In 1818, following Madison’s veto of the Bonus Bill, Clay made a speech in Congress 
about internal improvements.  In this speech Clay made statements such as “Considering, as I do, 
the existence of the power as of the first importance, not merely to the preservation of the Union 
of the States, paramount as that consideration should be above all others, but to the prosperity of 
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every great interest of the country, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, in peace and in war, it 
becomes us solemnly, and deliberately, and anxiously to examine the constitution, and not to 
surrender it, if fairly to be collected from a just interpretation of that instrument.”13  He goes on 
to state, “We should equally avoid that subtle process of argument which dissipated into air the 
powers of this government, and that spirit of encroachment which would snatch from the State 
powers not delegated to the federal government.  We shall thus escape both the dangers I have 
noticed – that of relapsing into the alarming weakness of the confederation, which is described as 
a mere rope of sand; and also, that other, perhaps not the greatest danger, consolidation.  No man 
deprecates more than I do, the idea of consolidation; yet between separation and consolidation, 
painful as would be the alternative, I would greatly prefer the latter.”14  Clay, in this speech 
cautions that a too great emphasis on state authority against central federal power itself 
endangers the very union of the states.  In his opinion, the threat of centralized government 
power, while potent, is the better alternative of the threat of too much state control. 
In 1825, Clay spoke in favor of a funding bill to extend the Cumberland Road.  In this 
speech, he is still cautioning against the danger of disunion of the western states.  The Niles’ 
Register reports his speech “Yet he would say thus much; that he considered the question as to 
the existence and the exercise of a power in the general government to carry into effect a system 
of internal improvements, as amounting to the question whether the union of these states should 
be preserved or not – a question which involved the dearest hopes and the brightest prospects of 
our country.”15  Later in the speech, the Register states, “Mr. C. thought that the principle of 
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preservation itself afforded sufficient argument in support of the measure now under 
construction:  He knew, indeed that all questions which glanced at the union of the states, and the 
possibility of its severance, should be touched lightly, and with a caution hand…I (said Mr. 
Clay), am not one of those who are in favor of covering our eyes, and concealing from ourselves 
the dangers to which we may be exposed.”16   
In speeches such as these, Porter, Calhoun and Clay resort to their oratory skills, using 
alarmist rhetoric, to further their support for internal improvements such as the National Road.  
As factions formed and established political dogmas for the new century, mere analytical details 
as found in the Gallatin report could be too easily set aside.  The transcendent, fiery speeches 
were used to keep legislation such as the National Road on the table.  These speeches could tend 
towards exaggerated consequences that while effective, did not portray the true state of affairs in 
the west. 
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Chapter 6: Perspective of the Western Settlers 
 
 The settlers of the Northwest Territories were far from being a homogenous people.  
Instead, settlement patterns have been referred to as “mosaic.”  Robert Swierenga describes the 
settlement as “Over time, particular families from particular staging areas migrated over 
particular paths to particular destinations, bringing with them as part of their cultural baggage 
their particular values and folkways.”1  The earliest Europeans in the Northwest Territories were 
the scattered French trappers, traders and explorers.  Following the Seven Years War, France 
ceded the Northwest Territory, along with Canada, to the British in the 1763 Treaty of Paris.  
The British denied settlers access to the Northwest Territory in accordance with their alliances 
with the Native American nations.  The British intended to keep the American colonies restricted 
to the eastern seaboard. 
Twenty years later, the 1783 Treaty of Paris ceded the Northwest Territory to the United 
States, and American settlers gradually began to move into these lands, along several distinct 
patterns.  Robert Swierenga described the three theories to migration patterns.2  The first being 
what he calls “latitude-specific.”  In this pattern people moved on east-west lines as their 
architecture, clothing, housekeeping and agricultural backgrounds would be easier to adapt to a 
similar climate.  An example of latitude-specific would be settlers from Maryland or New Jersey 
migrating to the Ohio River Valley.  The second pattern are those who sought to travel the least 
distance.  An example of this pattern would be Upper South settlers from Kentucky or Virginia 
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who merely moved to the north bank of the Ohio River.  The third pattern is referred to as 
“chain-migration.”  Swierenga describes this as “Once a viable ethnic community took hold in a 
new locale, letters back home induced more and more relatives and friends to come in an 
extended migration chain.”3  These chains could have their source in a community from an 
eastern state or from a foreign nation.  The chain migration could also have its source in an 
affiliation, such as a religious group.  Morris Birkbeck helped settle a community of British 
emigrants along the Wabash River in Illinois.  He wrote a number of letters to encourage other 
British emigrants to join this community.  These three primary migration patterns built the 
“mosaic” of settlement in the Northwest Territory.  Many ethnic communities still celebrate their 
cultural heritage, as some communities have an annual celebration such as Swedish Days, or an 
Octoberfest. 
This migration created a true borderland area as it caused friction with the existing Native 
American nations and the remaining French communities.  Among the early American settlers 
were veterans of the Revolutionary War.  These veterans were awarded portions of military 
tracts, known as bounty lands, as compensation for their service.  John Peck notes the popularity 
of these tracts among veterans, noting, “Many of the officers and soldiers that accompanied 
General Clark in his expedition became enamored with the country, returned with their families 
and formed the early settlements.”4  Jacob Burnet described these veteran settlers stating “The 
early adventurers to the North-western Territory, were generally men who had spent the prime of 
their lives in the war of Independence.  Many of them had exhausted their fortunes in 
maintaining the desperate struggle; and retired to the wilderness to conceal their poverty, and 
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avoid companions mortifying to their pride, while struggling to maintain their families and 
improve their condition.”5  The military tracts provided compensation to the veterans without 
straining the badly depleted national treasury, and the areas settled by these battle-tested veterans 
helped to secure the territory.  The veterans were rewarded for their service.  Those who opted 
for these lands had a chance for a new start, in a new community, and they established 
communities of strong militia in the sparsely settled territory. 
Most of the early American settlers were the “shortest-distance” emigrants from the 
Upper South states of Virginia and Kentucky.  These settlers merely ferried across the river to 
make homes along the north bank of the Ohio River valley.  These Upper South settlers were 
soon joined by a steady stream of the two other types of settlers.  Those from New England made 
their way west along the Great Lakes or down the Allegheny to the Ohio River.  These were 
joined by settlers from the Midlands.  This region included settlers from New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania and northern Maryland and Virginia.  This latter group made their way west using 
the mountain trails through Pennsylvania to access the Ohio River at Pittsburgh or Wheeling.  
The settlers from New England and the Midlands generally migrated using the latitude-specific 
pattern, sometimes including chain migration as well.  Once settlers arrived into the western 
territories, many moved within and through the new land before finally establishing a permanent 
home.  A community may have recorded a fast or slow overall rate of growth, but voter rolls 
indicate that the turnover of the citizenship was quite high.  This has been described as a 
                                                           
5 Jacob Burnet, Notes on the Early Settlement of the North-Western Territory (New York: D. Appleton & Co. 
Publishers, 1847), 42. 
62 
 
 
 
“swirling sea” of migration, especially in the cities.6  Over a ten-year period, there would be only 
a small core of voters who remained from the previous years. 
Before the construction of the National Road, the greatest challenge for emigrants was in 
making it to the Ohio River.  The trails were narrow, a horse could only pull a light, narrow 
wagon, and the few road improvements were often washed away by the rains.  One traveler 
described the path going up the mountain as a “cascade,” as it was nothing more than a 
waterway.  In his journal he states, “The only way to enable a single horse to drag after him his 
load, was, at every one of these petty cascades, to form a temporary inclined plane of stones or 
wood, or whatever material was nearest at hand; and with all our ingenuity, thrice were we 
completely stalled, and obligated to unload half our luggage to get on a few yards, and then 
reload.”7  This description is of a road used for more than western emigration.  These mountain 
trails were also used for commerce between the east and the west as well as for the postal 
service.  Perhaps most important of all, these were the military roads to move troops and supplies 
to the western territories.  The mountainous roads ended at the Ohio River or its northern 
tributary the Allegheny. 
Once settlers reached the river, they could ferry across the river and proceed west on 
unimproved wagon trails.  Most however, descended the river in large flatboats known as 
Kentucky boats or Arks.  These have been described as, “They are square, and flat-bottomed; 
about forty feet by fifteen, with sides six feet deep; covered with a roof of thin boards and 
accommodated with a fire-place…They require but four hands to navigate them; carry no sail 
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and are wafted down by the current.”8  These flatboats were usually launched in company with a 
small group of other boats.  Using groups of several boats with their thick, high gunwales was a 
means of protection against attacks by Native Americans.  The flatboats could carry a great deal 
of weight and material, including horses and livestock.   
Common destinations were the Great Miami and Little Miami River Valleys near 
Cincinnati, Ohio, and the Wabash River Valley along the Indiana and Illinois border.  As the 
Ohio River turned south past the Wabash, many families would land at Shawneetown on the 
eastern edge of Illinois and cross overland to the rich Mississippi Valley floodplain known as the 
American Bottom across from St. Louis.  A good voyage from Pittsburgh to Cincinnati would 
take about a week, with delays such as slow water or snags extending the trip up to a month.  The 
boats were too heavy and cumbersome to attempt ascent up the Ohio River tributaries.  Smaller 
craft could be used to row or sail up the tributaries when the currents were not too strong.  Once 
at their destination on the Ohio, the flatboats could be broken apart and sold for lumber or used 
for building a homestead. 
The emigration began slowly, but steadily increased over the years.  By 1795, the 
Greenville Treaty ending the Northwest Indian War had quieted fears and opened up Native 
American lands to settlers, and the Pickney Treaty with Spain had opened the port of New 
Orleans to American shipping.  As emigration increased, there was a fear that the territories were 
draining too many laborers away from eastern states.  Eastern manufacturers had assumed the 
settlers would be the lazy and discontents.  These would hardly be missed.  However, some of 
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the best classes of laborers and skilled workers began looking for a new life in the west.  Europe 
also began to feel the effects of emigration and were alarmed by the numbers of workers leaving 
for the American west.  As the Napoleonic Wars raged across European, some nations began to 
check the population losses due to emigration.   
In the United States, eastern leaders began to protest the loss of their best workers, and 
started to use propaganda in an attempt to dissuade emigration.  Frederick Ogg relates one 
incident as “Anti-emigration pamphlets were scattered broadcast, and, after the manner of the 
day, the leading western enterprises were belabored with much bad verse.  A rude cut which 
gained wide circulation represented a stout, ruddy, well-dressed man on a sleek horse, with a 
label, ‘I am going to Ohio,’ meeting a pale and ghastly skeleton of a man in rags on the wreck of 
what had once been a horse with the label, ‘I have been to Ohio’.”9  The western territories had 
always had always been portrayed as dangerous, and the western settlers as uncivilized.  Now the 
western lands were portrayed as unhealthy as well.  
 The historical record demonstrates that lawmakers were concerned by several aspects of 
the Trans-Appalachian territories.  In addition to the prospect of national disunion based on 
geographical terrain, they now faced the problem of the blood and sinew of the young nation 
moving west at an alarming rate.  This migration may have lessened the fear of international 
interference, but it raised the danger of the western territories someday becoming independent of 
the United States.  Many of the eastern lawmakers saw internal improvements such as roads and 
canals as an important, if not the only, agent in unifying and “cementing” the union.  One 
question to be addressed is how did the western settlers view national unity?  Were the people of 
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the Trans-Appalachian territory as tenuous in their nationalism as eastern lawmakers portrayed in 
their speeches?  A number of settlers and travelers left a record of their accounts of the western 
territories.  These can be used to sketch an ethnographical account of the western settlers to 
determine if their national allegiance was as fragile as has been portrayed. 
 Five works, in particular, some of which have been referenced above, are detailed 
accounts of western travelers and settlers.  Jacob Burnet settled in Ohio in 1796.  He produced a 
book entitled Notes on the Early Settlement of the North-Western Territory.10  John Reynolds 
was born in Pennsylvania in 1788 to Irish immigrant parents.  They moved first to Tennessee, 
and then in 1800 to Kaskaskia in Illinois.  Reynolds left his recollections in his book entitled My 
Own Times: Embracing Also, the History of My Life.11   Thaddeus Mason Harris was a minister 
and Harvard librarian.  In 1803, he traveled in the Northwest Territory and recorded his 
observations in a book entitled The journal of a tour into the territory northwest of the Alleghany 
mountains; made in the spring of the year 1803. With a geographical and historical account of 
the state of Ohio.12  Morris Birkbeck was an English immigrant who settled on the Illinois side of 
the Wabash River.  He published a collection of his correspondence and a travel journal entitled 
Letters from Illinois and Notes on a Journey in America, intending these to encourage other 
English immigrants to make their home in the territories.13  William Amphlett was an English 
immigrant who made his home on the banks of the Ohio river.  He wrote The Emigrant’s 
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Directory to the Western States of North America; including a voyage out from Liverpool; the 
geography and topography of the whole Western country, etc. as a guide for other British 
emigrants.14  These sources represent an aspect of the historiography that are first-hand accounts, 
intending to give an accurate portrayal of the Trans-Appalachian territories, including history, 
society and culture.  They complement each other on many topics, such as several describe the 
mounds left by the Mississippian Culture, with speculations as who built them and why.  They 
are generally in agreement as well in descriptions of the politics, culture and society of the 
American west. 
 Some of these writers make a point to refute the reports of the west as being unhealthy 
and uncivilized.  William Amphlett in particular addresses the health concern, writing, “I believe 
that by far the greater part of the reports that represent the lower counties on the Ohio as 
unhealthy, are altogether untrue; or so exaggerated as to give a very false picture of the real state 
of the country.”15  Later he writes “Unfavorable reports were industriously circulated last 
summer, concerning the ill health of the British settlers, but entirely without foundation.  With all 
the privations and fatigues inseparable from a new settlement, there was less disease than might 
have been expected, if every family had been at their old homes in England.”16   
Morris Birkbeck addressed the belief in the western settlers being uncivilized as he writes 
“I have good authority for contradicting a supposition that I have met with in England, respecting 
the inhabitants of Indiana; - that they are lawless, semi-barbarous, vagabonds, dangerous to live 
among.  On the contrary, the laws are respected, and are effectual; and the manners of the people 
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are kind and gentle to each other, and to strangers.”17  Birkbeck continues “As to the inhabitants 
of towns, the Americans are much alike, as far as we have had an opportunity of judging.  We 
look in vain, for any striking difference in the general deportment and appearance of the great 
bulk of Americans, from Norfolk on the eastern coast, to the town of Madison in Indiana.”18 
Amphlett and Birkbeck both attest first-hand experience in the western lands to refute the 
propaganda that would dissuade further migration to the western territories.  These two writers 
directed their correspondence to their friends in England, but Birkbeck makes another point in 
his letters, targeting those in the eastern states as he writes “Ignorant as they are in Europe of the 
inhabitants of the western states, they are fully as much so on the eastern side of this republic.”19   
Birkbeck’s letter reflects the western view that people of their own nation have a poor 
understanding of life west of the mountains. 
 The works left by these writers do more than refute erroneous beliefs, they also describe 
the culture and values of the western settlers.  Their writings support the concept of the western 
culture as a mosaic rather than a new homogenous culture.  While there were diverse elements, 
some shared cultural traits do emerge.  The population was made up of white, African-American 
and Native-American people.  The culture of the dominant white settler was a paradox, as they 
held to the idea of an egalitarian society while still retaining a distinct caste system.  They were 
racist, with a mix of tolerance.  Even among the few abolitionists, their egalitarian views would 
not extend to other races.  The settlers were strongly integrated into their local societies for 
general wellbeing and security.  They were spiritual, but not overtly religious. They were a 
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society in flux, and they eventually amalgamated themselves into a new national subculture – 
that of the Midwest, and they were patriots. 
The earliest settlers, those from the Upper South, introduced their culture and values as 
well as their agriculture, architecture and speech patterns to the Ohio Valley.  For the most part, 
the early Upper South culture was similar to most frontier cultures.  There was a vibrant local 
society.  People helped each other and were helped by others in turn.  They relied on their 
community as much as on themselves.  People were expected to face danger with courage and 
extend hospitality to those in need.  There was an expectation that newcomers would conform to 
these social ideals.   
There were few churches in the early settlements.  Baptist or Methodist itinerant 
missionaries would come through and hold camp meetings, or they would use the local court 
house for preaching.  Services were irregular, but they were well attended.  Frederick Ogg speaks 
of the Upper South migrants saying, “They were not so pious as the New Englanders, though 
they were capable of great religious enthusiasm, and their morals were probably not inferior.  
Their houses were poorer; their villages were not so well kept; their dress was more uncouth, and 
their ways rougher.  But they were hardy folk – brave, industrious, hospitable, and generous to a 
fault.”20  The history and the development of the new western culture has been a subject for the 
historiography as early as the 1890’s when Frederick Jackson Turner proposed his social 
evolution and his Frontier Thesis.  There have been a number of modern scholarly studies on the 
emerging culture, several of which have been referenced in this paper.  However, there are two 
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aspects of the new western culture that were instrumental in the development of infrastructure 
such as the National Road.  These are race and western nationalism. 
  At the time of the first-hand accounts of the western territories, the western culture was 
beginning to change.  The Upper South culture was still entrenched, especially in the 
southwestern portion of the Northwest Territory.  The Upper South culture included a limited 
caste system with it.  This caste system was comparable to the Cracker and Planter societies of 
the deep south.  James Simeone describes how the lower-class whites identified themselves as 
“white folk” as opposed to the wealthy “big folk.”  As lower, working-class whites, they saw 
themselves as of a lower social standing than the wealthy, while still believing themselves 
superior to African and Native-Americans.21  There were also social class rules for the Upper 
South culture.  One example was dueling.  Nicole Etcheson describe class-acceptable forms of 
violence saying, “The form that violence took depended on class: Upper-class Southerners 
dueled and lower-class Southerners brawled.  But any engagement in violence was also an 
affirmation of equality.  One may shrug aside an affront from one’s social inferior with impunity 
to one’s honor.  To fight a man because of an insult implies that one accepts him as an equal.”22  
The culture was a bit of a paradox, as in other areas, people had more of an egalitarian view.  
Birkbeck noted, “…witness the spirit and good sense with which men of all ranks are seen to 
engage in discussion on politics, history or religion; subjects which have attracted more or less, 
the attention of every one.”23  In areas of honor, there were distinct social expectations.  In the 
realm of speech and liberty, the society expected equality.   
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This spirit of equality did not extend to African-Americans.  Some southern emigrants 
even brought slavery into the territory.  The Northwest Ordinance had specifically banned 
slavery, but the ban was rarely enforced.  The courts issued narrow rulings that determined that 
the ordinance merely precluded bringing new slaves into the territory.  The courts based this 
narrow ruling as recognizing the slaves as property and that the Northwest Ordinance protected 
property rights as well. Those that did bring in new slaves were allowed to skirt the law by 
holding slaves under indentured servitude contracts with grossly exaggerated terms of service.  
These contracts of indenture were enforced by the courts as strongly as any slave would face in 
the south.  Indenture contracts could be bought and sold just as could any slave.  This practice 
was tolerated as it was limited and did not lead to a large slave population as in the south.   
While slavery was tolerated, it did not have widespread support.  There was a referendum 
to change the Illinois Constitution in 1824, with the understanding that the new constitution 
would likely make Illinois a slave state.  The people of Illinois voted down the referendum, not 
because they were against slavery, but primarily for economic reasons.  Money was scarce and 
working people did not want to have to compete against slave labor for jobs.  An additional 
reason they were against slavery was that they did not want to live under the threat of a slave 
uprising.  Instead of slavery, Black Laws were passed to limit the numbers and rights of African-
Americans living in the territory.   
As the National Road continued to push through the Appalachian Mountains, many more 
settlers continued to arrive from New England, the Midlands and Europe.  This new emigration 
changed the cultural dynamics, and the question of slavery north of the Ohio River was settled.  
Abolitionists began to have an impact on the territory and the region was crisscrossed by the 
underground railroad.  The Northwest Ordinance was based largely on Jefferson’s Land 
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Ordinance of 1784.  In this earlier ordinance, Jefferson’s draft attempted to include slave-free 
language, similar to that which failed to make its way into the later U.S. Constitution.  The 1787 
Northwest Ordinance however did finally ban slavery in the territory.  Jefferson was a forward-
looking leader.  When he spoke of the need for a National Road to “cement” the Trans-
Appalachian territories, he would have known someday this would result in a number of free 
states added to the Union. 
Political leaders from the southern slave-holding states had supported the National Road 
during the Jefferson Administration.  The Northwest Territories began to increase in population 
and form into new free states.  The formerly dominant Upper South culture began to diminish as 
the cultural mosaic was balanced by other immigrants.  As the new western mosaic culture 
developed, the southern states’ support for the National Road began to wane.  The south became 
concerned with the growing populations and the increased political power of the north.  Coupled 
with this concern, the federal government briefly experienced expanded power following the 
War of 1812.   
To the slave-holding south, federal infrastructure improvements seemed to them as an 
avenue, not just for transportation, but for federal overreach.  If the federal government could 
exert interstate authority on transportation, it could exert authority on other issues including 
slavery.  Southern leaders began to balk at funding for infrastructure, using the argument that it 
was unconstitutional.  In 1830, two federal infrastructure bills failed to make it through 
Congress.  The interstate Buffalo to Washington to New Orleans Road Bill and the subsequent 
in-state Kentucky Maysville Road Bill were both blocked by proslavery Southern votes.  
Appeals to funding infrastructure improvements in order to preserve national unity were not 
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enough to overcome the southern bloc.  Federal funding, oversight and control of the National 
Road was nearing an end. 
 From the time of Washington’s letter to Harrison until Clay’s fiery speeches, political 
leaders presented a west in danger of disunion.  This was a legitimate concern, but it was based 
on speculation.  While there had been some international and domestic intrigues, they never 
developed into an actual threat of disunion.  The western settler’s own level of patriotism and 
nationalism had been sufficient to “cement” the western territories to the eastern states.  The 
early writers, with their first-hand observations, described the settlers as having a strong 
commitment to liberty, and an attachment to their American heritage. 
 Morris Birkbeck mentioned the western passion for liberty as an integral part of the 
culture in a number of his letters. He wrote, “Liberty is no subject of dispute or speculation 
among us Back-woods men: it is the very atmosphere we breathe.”24  This sentiment is echoed 
by John Reynolds as he states, “Although the pioneers knew little and cared less about literature, 
yet, they entertained just and sound principles of liberty.  No people delighted in the free and full 
enjoyment of a free government more than they did.  This passion for freedom made strong 
impressions on them, and governed their actions and conduct to some extent, in almost 
everything.  This idea of liberty gave them a personal independence and confidence in 
themselves that marked their actions through life.”25   
This commitment to liberty would conflict with the notion of the western settlers 
becoming political subjects of Spain or Britain.  Birkbeck, in his letters to prospective English 
emigrants wrote at length about the advantages of becoming an American, rather than living 
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under English rule.  One of his strongest arguments was in property rights as he stated in an early 
letter:  
An English farmer, to which class I had the honour to belong, is in 
possession of the same rights and privileges with the Villeins of old time, and 
exhibits for the most part, a suitable political character.  He has no voice in the 
appointment of the legislature unless he happens to possess a freehold of forty 
shillings a year, and he is then expected to vote in the interest of his landlord: he 
has no concern with public affairs excepting as a tax-payer, a parish officer, or a 
militia man.26   
 
In contrast to the English farmer who only rents his land, Birkbeck writes how in 
America the farmer can buy and sell his own ground.27  Instead of rents rising over time, the land 
owned by the American farmer will increase in value through appreciation and by improvements.  
In America, the farmer can invest in his own holding, rather than working and improving land 
held by the local landowner. 
John Reynolds, as the son of Irish immigrant parents also wrote on the anti-British 
sentiment.  He wrote of this stating, “I have alluded to the invincible hatred of my father toward 
the British government, principally because the same feelings are shared by the vast majority of 
the Irish people, at this very hour.  It was that spirit which impelled the Irish volunteers to seek 
the front ranks in every forlorn hope of our revolution.”28   This anti-British sentiment was 
widespread throughout the west.  William Amphlett even refers to this as he describes the inns 
along the road in western Pennsylvania.  He mentions the inns and the differences in those run by 
the Irish, the Germans or the Dutch.  Of an English run inn, he states, “One only did we meet 
with kept by an Englishman, and that a most unhappy man, who had brought over with him all 
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his national pride and prejudice, of which he could not divest himself, and he evidently lived at 
variance with all his neighbors.”29  The attitude of his neighbors illustrates not only their anti-
British sentiment, but also their tolerance of a pro-British innkeeper along the road.  Amphlett 
even noted that a number of British emigrants to Canada reconsidered their choice and made 
their way south to the Northwest Territories.30  The western settlers continued to resent British 
occupation of forts on American territory and the British arming and supplying Native 
Americans in an effort to keep American expansion in check. 
There were anti-Spain sentiments in the western territories as well. Jacob Burnett 
described the level of resentment towards Spain for restricting access to the lower Mississippi 
River and the port of New Orleans.31  He describes Spanish agents on the Ohio River claimed to 
be merchants.  It was noted however that they had a large amount of money and little trade 
goods.  The people suspected that the merchants were in fact agents involved in conspiracy 
against the United States.  One agent was later found murdered on his boat, supposedly by 
robbers.  Burnett writes how settlers met and demanded action from the federal government to 
open the Mississippi for shipping, threatening to take action themselves if needed.  Spanish 
restrictions on navigation caused considerable resentment.  The Spanish Conspiracy by Dr. 
White and James Wilkerson was the only incident of conspiracy with Spain, and it achieved 
nothing more than tainting the reputations of these two men.  Liberty was too deeply ingrained in 
the western culture for the western settlers to consider subjecting themselves and their lands to 
Britain or Spain. 
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Other western intrigues also failed to coalesce into a real threat to the Union.  The 
Whiskey Rebels had limited support and were quickly scattered.  In their defense, they 
adamantly denied the charge of treason, believing they had acted within their constitutional 
rights.  The State of Franklin had broad local support in their attempt to join the Union as the 
fourteenth state.  When a schism attempted to declare an independent state, the rest of the local 
faction turned against them.  Aaron Burr had been welcomed as a distinguished visitor from the 
East.  When he was accused of being a traitor, the people of the west joined in condemning him.  
Burnet described this as “…it was amusing to see those men, who had so recently been the most 
devoted attendants on the Colonel, and the most vocal in his praise, denouncing him as a traitor, 
and tendering their services to the Governor of the State, to arrest the culprit and bring him to 
justice.”32  These incidents have been cited as reasons to fear western disunion.  In contrast, the 
reactions of the western settlers, while being a tolerant society, had no place for traitors. 
The western citizens celebrated their national heritage.  Many of the early place names 
reflected their ties to the Revolutionary War.  Counties were often named after the nation’s 
founders such as Washington, Adams, Franklin, Hamilton and Jefferson.  Revolutionary war 
hero such as Greene, Marion, Warren and Montgomery were honored as well.  Even cities were 
established with names like Union Town, Bunker Hill, and Mount Vernon.  The western settlers 
gathered together to have a holiday celebration on July 4th.  Reynolds describes this as “The 
celebration of the Fourth of July was frequently, in those early times, made by horse-races and 
other sports, to demonstrate the joy of the people.”33  The west even had its own version of the 
Liberty Bell for this occasion.   When General Clark took the British fort at Kaskaskia on the 
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Mississippi river on July 4, 1778, the citizens rang the bell at the Catholic Church to celebrate.  
The bell, originally a gift from the French King Louis XV, was then rung annually to celebrate 
Independence Day.  The bell is still housed in a small visitor’s center in Kaskaskia.  When the 
National Road finally reached the Ohio river, the Conestoga wagons that transported freight were 
all panted red, white and blue in honor of the nation’s flag.  The western citizens celebrated their 
nationality and heritage as Americans. 
The western citizens were separated from the east by distance and terrain, but they were 
still informed in their nation’s politics.  There were local newspapers, and Birkbeck noted that 
the settlers in Illinois received eastern newspapers as well as he states, “We are not quite out of 
hearing of the world and its bustle, but the sound is rather long in reaching us.  We receive the 
Philadelphia daily papers once a week, about a month after they are published.”34  He described 
the press as an essential agent of communication between east and west as he later stated, “Not a 
nerve is touched in the remotest corner of the Union but it vibrates in Washington, the sensorium 
of this immense and truly living body.  From this centre of feeling intelligence, the impression is 
returned to the extremities with a freshness that is astonishing as it is delightful, through the 
unwearied activity of an unshackled press.”35  The mountains may have impeded transportation, 
but they only delayed delivery of newspapers.  The media, as much or more than infrastructure, 
was a vital agency in national unity. 
The western people were also involved in their country’s politics.  Their pride in the 
political process showed in their quest for statehood.  They were anxious to achieve population 
thresholds and celebrated the day their territory joined the Union as a state of equal standing.  
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The west was strongly Republican, solidly backing Madison, Monroe and Jackson.  Ohio was the 
first to achieve statehood in 1802 and gave its three electoral votes to Jefferson.  Indiana and 
Illinois followed Ohio’s lead in voting Republican.  It was not until 1836 that the western vote 
began to drift towards Whig candidates.  This political alignment would seem to contradict the 
benefit the developing states could achieve from Federalist policies which would have promoted 
more internal improvements and infrastructure spending.  As much as the western territories 
wanted infrastructure improvements, they were jealous of their liberty and suspicious of a strong 
central federal government.  Amphlett explains this as “Respecting their intellectual attainments, 
I think it is in general restricted to political knowledge, they all know their RIGHTS, and will 
maintain them; and the frequency of elections is a constant lesson on their importance, as well as 
the best guarantee of the continuance of their liberty.”36 
The westerner became a type of the American culture.  The Americans living east of the 
mountains were seen as Northern or Southern.  The Trans-Appalachian settlers did not fit either 
of these definitions.  While many retained the cultural traits of their origins, they began to take a 
pride in the identity of being a Westerner.  Nicole Etcheson describes this as “Some unifying 
forces did exist in the Old Northwest.  As a new region distinct from New England and the 
South, the West inspired its residents with a loyalty to its own needs and institutions.  Political 
candidates such as William Henry Harrison, Henry Clay, and Andrew Jackson attempted to 
exploit that loyalty by running as Westerners.”37  Being from the west had political advantages.  
Most of the national votes were in the east, divided into northern and southern factions.  Being 
from the west, the candidates could avoid objection from either of the eastern regions.  Clay, 
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interestingly boasted of his heritage in the west, while at the same time pleading the danger of 
western disunion. 
The diversity of the western mosaic culture was a strength.  Emigrants came from the 
Upper South, New England, the Midlands and from Europe.  There was no dominant group.  One 
thing that held these factions together was their country.  They were all Americans.  Morris 
Birkbeck left England to become an American.  He spoke for many when he stated, “I love this 
government; and thus, a novel sensation is excited: it is like the development of a new faculty.  I 
am become a patriot in my old age: thus, new virtue will spring up in my bosom.”38  Birkbeck 
wrote letters home to England to encourage more emigrants.  In one of his final letters he writes, 
“America yet needs muscles and sinews – Europe offers them…If they come in groups and 
remain so, they will be groups of freemen.  Why does America love her government?  Will not 
these men love it for the same reason, and more intensely, from the recollection of the bondage 
they have quitted?”39  Birkbeck’s new American home was on the Wabash River between 
Indiana and Illinois.  He wrote these words from a remote location, separated by mountains and 
wilderness from the nation’s capital.  Yet from his isolated western community, he looks about 
him and writes that people love their government. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
38 Birkbeck, Letters, 29. 
39 Birkbeck, Letters, 113 
79 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Conestoga Wagon Display (National Road Interpretive Center; Vandalia, IL) 
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Conclusion 
  
The United States defied conventional political theory to become the first democratic 
society over a great expanse of territory.  There were fears that the political model would fail due 
to divergent interests of a nation divided by the challenging distance and terrain.  People feared 
disunion as Lewis notes “That the union was fragile was as widely accepted as the idea that it 
was essential.”1  The proponents of the National Road believed infrastructure improvements 
could “cement” the distant portions of the nation into a unified people.  These proponents 
sometimes used alarmist rhetoric to force passage of the internal improvement legislation.  They 
were successful in passing such legislation with widespread support.  
As southern legislators became alarmed at the growing strength of the North, they feared 
the waxing power of the free states posed a threat to their southern slave-based economy.  They 
responded by resisting further funding of the National Road by questioning the constitutional 
authority of the federal government to oversee and fund the road.  The later proponents of the 
road, such as Calhoun and Clay, increased their rhetoric, saying funding of the road was essential 
to preserve national unity.  Stephen Minicucci notes this stating “By 1824, the internal-
improvements-as-nation-building argument was an established element of the rhetorical 
vocabulary of conservative politicians.  No major speech in favor of internal improvements 
neglected to make at least a passing reference to this theme.”2  The rhetoric contested with the 
southern resistance for funding.  Eventually, the age of steam powered shipping diminished the 
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need for the National Road.  In this new age of transportation, the southern bloc proved too 
strong and the National Road was turned over to the states.  
The proponents of the National Road were concerned, well-meaning leaders, and the 
National Road was a much-needed project, but the perils of western disunion misjudged the true 
level of nationalism and loyalty of the western citizens.  The western settlers were in fact 
patriots, with little desire to join with another nation or to form their own independent nation.  
The primary sources of letters and travel journals described the western settlers as anxious to 
form even stronger ties with the eastern states.  The western settlers looked forward to the day 
when their territory would be elevated to statehood and join the Union.   
The real threat, when it came, was not caused by mountains and distance, but by the 
southern economy, social institutions and cultural beliefs about race.  Frederick Ogg notes the 
economic conflict, writing, “Under play of climatic and industrial forces, the West had itself 
fallen apart into sections.  Foremost was the cleavage between North and South, on a line marked 
roughly by the Ohio River.  Climate, soil, the cotton gin, and slavery combined to make of the 
southern West a great cotton-raising area, interested in the same things and swayed by the same 
impulses as the southern seaboard.  Similarly, economic conditions combined to make the 
northern West a land of small farmers, free labor, town-building, and diversified manufactures 
and trade.”3  The question of slavery had migrated west with the expanding nation.   
From the time of the founding of the nation, compromise had held the slavery conflict at 
bay.  In 1857, the Dred Scott decision energized the debate over the future of slavery in America.  
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Following Lincoln’s election, disunion finally ruptured the nation.  It was not distance or the 
mountain ranges that divided the nation.  It was not caused by domestic or international 
conspiracy.  The greatest challenge to national unity proved to be race and economy.     
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Appendix: Land Ordinance of 17841 
 
By the UNITED STATES in CONGRESS Assembled.  
APRIL 23, 1784. 
RESOLVED,  
THAT so much of the territory ceded, or to be ceded by individual states, to the United State, as 
is already purchased, or shall be purchased, of the Indian inhabitants, and offered for sale by 
Congress, shall be divided into distinct states in the following manner, as nearly as such cessions 
will admit; that is to say, by parallels of latitude, so that each state shall comprehend from north 
to south two degrees of latitude, beginning to count from the completion of forty-five degrees 
north of the equator; and by meridians of longitude, one of which shall pass through the lowest 
point of the rapids of Ohio, and the other through the western cape of the mouth of the great 
Kanhaway: but the territory eastward of this last meridian, between the Ohio, lake Erie, and 
Pennsylvania, shall be one state, whatsoever may be its comprehension of latitude. That which 
may lie beyond the completion of the forty-fifth degree between the said meridian shall make 
part of the state adjoining it on the south: and that part of the Ohio, which is between the same 
meridians coinciding nearly with the parallel of thirty-nine degrees, shall be substituted so far in 
lieu of that parallel as a boundary line. 
That the settlers on any territory so purchased and offered for sale, shall either on their own 
petition, or on the order of Congress, receive authority from them, with appointments of time and 
place, for their free males of full age, within the limits of their state, to meet together, for the 
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purpose of establishing a temporary government, to adopt the constitution and laws of any one of 
the original states; so that such laws nevertheless shall be subject to alteration by their ordinary 
legislature; and to erect, subject to a like alteration, counties, townships, or other divisions, for 
the election of members for their legislature. 
That when any such state shall have acquired twenty thousand free inhabitants, on giving due 
proof thereof to Congress, they shall receive from them authority, with appointments of time and 
place, to call a convention of representatives, to establish a permanent constitution and 
government for themselves. Provided that both the temporary and governments be established on 
these principles as their basis. 
FIRST. That they shall for ever remain a part of this confederacy of the United States of 
America. 
SECOND. That they shall be subject to the articles of confederation in all those cases, in which 
the original states shall be so subject; and to all the acts and ordinances of the United States in 
Congress assembled, conformable thereto. 
THIRD. That they in no case shall interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United 
States in Congress assembled; nor with the ordinances and regulations which Congress may find 
necessary for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers. 
FOURTH. That they shall be subject to pay a part of the federal debts, contracted or to be 
contracted; to be apportioned on them by Congress, according to the same common rule and 
measure by which apportionments thereof shall be made on the other states. 
FIFTH. That no tax shall be imposed on lands the property of the United States. 
SIXTH. That their respective governments shall be republican. 
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SEVENTH. That the lands of non-resident proprietors shall in no case be taxed higher than those 
of residents within any new state, before the admission thereof to a vote by its delegates in 
Congress. 
That whensoever any of the said states shall have of free inhabitants, as many as shall then be in 
any one, the least numerous, of the thirteen original states, such state shall be admitted by its 
delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the said original states; 
provided the consent of so many states in Congress is first obtained as may at the time be 
competent to such admission. And in order to adapt the said articles of confederation to the state 
of Congress, when its number shall be thus encreased, it shall be proposed to the legislatures of 
the states, originally parties thereto, to require the assent of two thirds of the United States in 
Congress assembled, in all those cases, wherein by the said articles, the assent of nine states is 
now required; which being agreed to by them, shall be binding on the new states. Until such 
admission by their delegates into Congress, any of the said states after the establishment of their 
temporary government shall have authority to keep a member in Congress, with a right of 
debating, but not of voting. 
That measures not inconsistent with the principles of the confederation, and necessary for the 
preservation of peace and good order among the settlers, in any of the said new states, until they 
shall assume a temporary government as aforesaid, may from time to time be taken by the United 
States in Congress assembled. 
That the preceding articles shall be formed into a charter of compact; shall be duly executed by 
the president of the United States in Congress assembled, under his hand, and the seal of the 
United States; shall be promulgated; and shall stand as fundamental constitutions between the 
thirteen original states, and each of the several states now newly described, unalterable from and  
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after the sale of any part of the territory of such state, pursuant to this resolve, but by the joint 
consent of the United states in Congress assembled, and of the particular state within which such 
alteration is proposed to be made. 
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